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Abstract
Fault detection and isolation (FDI) is an important aspect of effective fault tolerant control
architectures. The Electronic System Laboratory at Stellenbosch University identified the
need to study viable methods of FDI. In this research two FDI methods for actuator failures
on the Meraka Modular UAV are investigated.
The Meraka Modular UAV is an unmanned aircraft that was developed by the CSIR. A
simple six degree of freedom non-linear mathematical model is developed that presents a
platform on which the two FDI methods are formulated. The theoretical model is used in
a simulation environment to extensively test and compare the performance of the proposed
FDI methods in different types of flight conditions.
The first method investigated is a multiple model adaptive estimator (MMAE), which in-
corporates a bank of Kalman filters. Each Kalman filter in the MMAE is conditioned for
each expected actuator fault scenario. The limitations of using linear Kalman filters are ex-
plained and they are replaced by extended Kalman filters, whose associated advantages and
disadvantages are discussed. Each filter in the bank of Kalman filters produces a residual
vector and residual covariance matrix. This information is subjected to a Bayes classifier to
determine the fault scenario which will have the highest likelihood of being active.
The second method that is studied incorporates the parity space approach for FDI. The
parity space consists of the parity relations that quantify all the analytical redundancies
available between the sensors’ outputs and actuator inputs of a system. A transformation
matrix is then optimised to transform these parity relations into residuals that are specially
sensitive to specific actuator faults. Actuator faults cause the parity space residuals’ variance
to increase. A cumulative summation procedure is used to determine when the residuals’
variance has changed sufficiently to indicate an actuator fault. A pseudoinverse actuator
estimation scheme is used to extract the actuator deflections from the parity relations.
The FDI performance is tested by deliberately failing specific actuators of the Meraka Modu-
lar UAV in-flight. The flight test data is then used to analyse and compare the performance
of the two FDI methods investigated in the research. It is found that, for the specific
Meraka Modular UAV, the FDI performs as expected with disturbance effects and actuator
excitation influencing the FDI effectiveness. The research shows that the bank of Kalman
filters creates less false alarms whereas the parity space FDI is more sensitive to faults. It
is illustrated that FDI can be improved with active actuator excitation and process noise
estimation techniques, delivering promising results.
iii
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Uittreksel
Fout-deteksie en -isolasie (FDI) is belangrik vir ’n stelsel se beheerder om foute te kan
hanteer. Die Elektroniese Stelsellabaratorium (ESL) by die Universiteit van Stellenbosch
het die behoefte geïdentifiseer om te gaan kyk na moontlike FDI-stelsels wat gebruik kan
word op hul onbemande vliegtuie (OV). In hierdie navorsing is daar na twee FDI-metodes
gekyk wat op die Meraka Modulêre OV toegepas kan word.
Die Meraka Modulêre OV is ’n vliegtuig wat deur die WNNR ontwikkel is. ’n Eenvoudige ses-
grade-van-vryheid, nie-liniêre wiskundige model van die Meraka Modulêre OV is ontwikkel,
en die FDI-metodes is rondom hierdie model geformuleer. Die teoretiese model is gebruik
in ’n simulasie-omgewing en die werkverrigting van die twee FDI-metodes is in verskillende
vlug-omstandighede getoets en vergelyk.
Die eerste metode waarna gekyk is, was ’n multi-model aanpasbare afskatter (MMAA), wat
’n bank van Kalman-filters gebruik. Elke Kalman-filter in die MMAA is gekondisioneer
vir elke denkbare aktueerder-fout. Die beperkinge rondom liniêre Kalman-filters is uitgelig
en vergelyk met uitgebreide Kalman-filters, waarvan die voor- en nadele bespreek is. Elke
filter in die MMAA produseer ’n residu-vektor en residu-kovariansiematriks. Hierdie infor-
masie is na ’n Bayes-klassifiseerder gestuur om te bepaal watter fout-senario die grootste
waarskynlikheid het om aktief te wees.
Die tweede metode waarna gekyk is, het die pariteitsruimte vir FDI gebruik. Die pariteits-
ruimte is uit al die pariteitsverwantskappe opgebou wat die verhoudings tussen al die insette
en uitsette van ’n sisteem kwantifiseer. ’n Transformasie-matriks is geoptimaliseer om hier-
die pariteitsverwantskappe te transformeer na residue wat elkeen sensitief is tot ’n spesikiefe
aktueerderfout. ’n Spesifieke aktueerderfout veroorsaak dat ’n spesifieke residu se variansie
verhoog. ’n Kummulatiewe sommeringsproses is dan gebruik om te bepaal of die variansie
genoegsaam toegeneem het. Sodoende kon daar bepaal word of ’n fout ontstaan het. ’n
Pseudo-inversaktueerder-afskattingstegniek is gebruik om die afgeskatte aktueerderdefleksie
uit die pariteitsverwantskappe te onttrek.
Die FDI-werkverrigtinge van die twee metodes is getoets deur sekere aktueerders met opset
te laat faal gedurende vlugtoetse. Die vlugtoetsdata is gebruik om die werkverrigting van die
FDI-metodes te analiseer en met mekaar te vergelyk. Met die spesifieke Meraka Modulêre
OV is, soos te wagte, bevind dat versteurings en aktueerderopwekking ’n groot invloed op
die FDI’s se werkverrigtinge toon.
iv
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UITTREKSEL v
Die bevindinge het getoon dat die MMAA-metode minder vals alarms veroorsaak, terwyl
die pariteitsruimte meer sensitief vir foute is. Die navorsing toon ook dat die werkverrigting
van beide FDI-metodes verbeter kan word met behulp van bykomende aktueerderopwekking
en prosesdruisafskattingsmetodes, wat goeie resultate lewer.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
With increased technological advancement over the past century, our reliance on the systems
that govern our daily lives has become greater than ever before. Humanity has reached
a state in which it cannot operate without the complex systems that supply our energy,
transportation, food security and even entertainment. The complexity of these systems
necessitates improved reliability of the control systems that manage most of these systems.
It is clear that a structure of fault detection is paramount in the pursuit of safety, reliability
and performance. One of the emerging industries today is automated systems that totally
or partially rely on themselves to achieve these three objectives. In this thesis actuator fault
detection and isolation of an automated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) will be the subject
of research.
UAVs have increasingly been used since the 1990s for important automated tasks in several
different industries. These tasks include [2]:
• Inspections of power lines, bridges and dams
• Forest monitoring, fire detection, fire fighting (operation and management)
• Sea rescue searches
• Border patrols and law enforcement
• Environmental and climate research
• Monitoring traffic and transportation systems
• Charting and mapping
• Prospecting
• Crop yield prediction, drought monitoring and spraying of pesticides
• Observation of oil and gas pipelines in remote areas
• Tactical reconnaissance and operational support
1
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Because of the large economic benefit UAVs have, it becomes apparent that the safety and
reliability of these UAVs are vital. Several different schemes are being used to meet these
goals. Redundancy and robustness are frequently used but compromises performance. Fault
tolerant control (FTC) systems, a fairly new branch of control automation, overcome the
need to compromise on performance by adapting the system to the fault that has occurred.
These schemes are used not only in the unmanned aerospace industry, but in most modern
technological systems that rely on sophisticated control systems. Most of these systems are
safety-critical systems such as spacecraft, nuclear power stations, chemical plants, automo-
biles and manned aircraft. The aim of fault tolerance is to prevent faults from developing
into serious failure, hence increasing the availability of the system and reducing the risk
of safety hazards. It is necessary to design control systems that are capable of tolerating
potential faults in these systems in order to improve the reliability and availability while
providing desirable performance.
In a typical aircraft the pilot or control system can manipulate a set of input mechanisms.
These mechanisms, such as the thrust generating engines and control surfaces, are controlled
to create moments and forces that ultimately change the states of the aircraft in some desired
way. The control surfaces are also commonly referred to as actuators.
A traditional airplane has three independent control actuators: the aileron pair, elevator pair
and rudder. These actuators must generate desired moments and forces for which a unique
solution for control can be found [3]. However, to increase the reliability, manoeuvrability
and survivability of modern airplanes, control actuators are no longer limited to just these
three. Many more control actuators have been introduced, as well as the decoupling of the
actuator pairs, so that the left and right actuator surfaces can deflect independently. With
an increase in the number of redundant actuators, the problem of allocating these controls to
achieve the desired moments and forces becomes non-unique. Such redundancy has called
for effective control allocation or re-allocation (in case of actuator failures) to optimally
distribute the required control moment over available actuators.
A control re-allocation system was developed at Stellenbosch University as a master’s
study [3] and it forms an integral part of the fault tolerant control architecture being de-
veloped at their Electronics Systems Laboratory (ESL). Control allocation and re-allocation
is an important process in a typical fault tolerant control scheme. A faulty actuator degrades
the achievable moments and forces that can be created by the set of actuators. The con-
trol allocation system minimises the difference between the desired and achievable aircraft
performance parameters by optimising the allocation of control effort commanded by the
control system to the physical actuators on the aircraft. For the control allocation scheme
to work it must know that a fault has occurred and it must know the type of fault, the size
of the fault, and which actuators are defective [3].
For an effective control allocation process a reliable fault detection and isolation (FDI)
system must be in place to supply the required information. Aircraft can use several costly
sensors directly attached to the control surfaces to conduct the FDI process by means of a
voting scheme. In recent years it has become common practice to use analytical redundancy
to supplement some of the sensors in achieving FDI and so reduce the required costs for
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reliable FDI. The topic of this research therefore focuses on actuator fault detection and
isolation through the use of analytical redundancy.
1.2 Preliminary Literature Study
The FDI for UAVs is a rich field of research and a review on the literature will be presented
in the following categories:
• Definitions of FTC and FDI
• Different theories, models and hypotheses
• Existing data and empirical findings
• Measurement techniques and instruments for hypotheses testing
1.2.1 Definitions of Fault Tolerant Control and Fault Detection and
Isolation
Since the research will form part of a fault tolerant control architecture, the definition
of a fault tolerant system and the corresponding terminology must be understood. The
distinction between a fault and a failure is discussed in [4], where a “fault is an unpermitted
deviation of at least one characteristic property (feature) of the system from the acceptable,
usual, standard condition” and a “failure is a permanent interruption of a system’s ability
to perform a required function under specified operating conditions”.
In this research only actuator faults are considered but sensor faults can easily be incorpo-
rated into the FDI systems. The reason for this decision is to focus attention on the actuator
failure information that is required for the control allocation system. An aircraft has several
actuators which may fail at any time on board the aircraft. There are an infinite number of
ways in which an actuator can fail. Four of the most common types of operating modes are
described below, of which three are failure modes.
(a) No-fault - This mode is the nominal operating mode of an actuator. The actuator
follows the desired deflection accurately (figure 1.1a).
(b) Floating - The control surface can become detached from the control actuator or can
become completely ineffective. This creates a surface that floats around the zero-
deflection position (figure 1.1b). This can be described as an additive fault.
(c) Locked-in-place - The control surface can become stuck at an arbitrary deflection
position (figure 1.1c). This can be described as an additive fault.
(d) Effectiveness - The effectiveness of the actuator can become distorted, resulting in a
larger or smaller deflection than desired (figure 1.1d). This can be described as an
multiplicative fault.
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Figure 1.1: Different fault modes: (a) no-fault; (b) floating fault; (c) locked-in-place fault; (d)
effectiveness fault. tF indicates the start of the fault.
Fault tolerant control is a control architecture that is capable of handling a fault or multiple
faults while still operating the system at an acceptable performance level. There are several
different fault tolerant control schemes that mainly focus on robust control design or adaptive
control design. However, for robust control, performance degradation after a fault occurred
is a significant issue, whereas for adaptive control, stability assurance is a hurdle [5].
FTC systems usually have several loops in which fault tolerance is applied. In the inner loop
an FDI process, which supplies the control allocator with actuator health information, can
be used so that the fault affects the performance of the aircraft as little as possible. This is a
first defence for faults and will be the method implied in this research. The architecture for
this type of first defence FTC is shown in figure 1.2. When performance degradation is such
that it becomes unacceptable, other fault tolerant processes such as an adaptive controller
can be adapted until performance and stability is restored [6].
A more comprehensive bibliographic review on the topic can be found in [7].
Fault detection and isolation systems (also known as a fault detection and diagnosis systems)
are concerned with the following three tasks:
1 Fault detection - It is necessary for the system to detect that something has gone
wrong, even if it cannot directly determine where the fault is.
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Figure 1.2: FTC architecture with a FDI and control re-allocation module.
2 Fault isolation - It is the process by which it is determined what part of the system is
operating in a faulty manner, for example, “the left elevator is faulty”.
3 Fault identification - The extent of the fault is determined and categorised, for example,
“the left flap is stuck at -1.3 degrees” or “the right rudder is floating with an amplitude
of two degrees”.
In this research it is of paramount importance to implement all three tasks so that the
necessary information can be supplied to the control allocation system. The basic thought
process of the desired system after a fault occurs is shown in figure 1.3.
As seen in figure 1.3, the sensor outputs and control inputs are the only available information
from which FDI can be done. These outputs and inputs are used by a residual generator to
create residuals. Residuals exhibit specific statistical characteristics that are extracted by
calculations of decision statistics. The decision statistics are then used to make a decision
about detecting the fault, isolating the fault and identifying the fault. The three respon-
sibilities of detection, isolation and identification may be executed in parallel or in series. In
some FDI systems, a single detection indicates that a fault is present, as well as its position.
The FDI scheme is usually run on-line, in real time. In most systems, the fault detection
algorithm is running continuously, while the isolation task is activated only upon the detec-
tion of the fault [8]. There are also two families of FDI systems, namely active and passive
FDI systems. Active FDI will constantly monitor the system while artificially exciting the
UAV [9; 5; 10; 11; 12] through the aircraft’s actuators. This method decreases the time it
takes to detect a fault and can also guarantee fault detection in a set amount of time [13].
The disadvantage of active fault detection is that more energy is used to excite the actua-
tors, the actuators wear out faster due to more use, and some level of performance is lost.
The second family is passive FDI systems, which also constantly monitor the health of the
actuators, but do not artificially excite the actuators to assist the FDI process [14]. Most
FDI techniques can be tuned to be either an active or passive FDI system.
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Figure 1.3: Thought process for FDI and control allocation.
Some methods and definitions of control allocation are discussed in [6; 15; 16; 17]. There is
also a distinction between passive and active FTCs, and [7] is an excellent starting point for
a bibliographic review on the topic. More definitions of FTC, FDI and control allocation
can be found in [18].
1.2.2 Different Theories, Models and Hypotheses
Several fault tolerant control methods exist and for the research done for this thesis, control
re-allocation with a FDI module is the required FTC architecture. An in-depth analysis
of the topic is beyond the scope of this study. For a comprehensive list of different FTC
methods available, consult [7].
There are also several FDI methods available. These FDI methods can depend on a model
based approach or a data based approach. A mathematical model of the aircraft is available
and therefore a model based approach is more appropriate for this research. The model based
approaches can further be classified by their outcome as a qualitative or quantitative method.
A qualitative method can use fuzzy logic or other decision processes to give a measure of
fault quality, for example “the left rudder is stuck at a high angle”. The quantitative methods
apply numerical values to their decisions such as “the right aileron is stuck at -3 degrees”.
The control re-allocation system requires quantitative information to operate and therefore
a quantitative method for FDI is an obvious choice.
Several techniques that address the problem of quantitative, model based FDI include [2]:
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• State estimation techniques: A fault usually changes the expected state of a system
in an additive way. State estimation techniques use the innovations (measurement
residual) of the estimators as a means to quantify the discrepancy between the expected
behaviour of the system and the observed behaviour. Most faults can be classified as
additive and therefore makes this method attractive.
– Observer based approach [19] - The residuals from an observer also qualify for
use in an FDI system. There are ways of decoupling disturbances with “unknown
input” design methods. The design of the observer can be used to optimise the
residuals for FDI as well as to control the observer dynamics.
– Kalman filter (KF) based [20] - A multiple model adaptive estimation (MMAE)
technique uses a bank of Kalman filters to estimate the probability of a specific
fault scenario. The MMAE method can be applied in practice as long as the
expected faults can be hypothesised by a reasonable number of KFs.
• Parameter estimation techniques [21]: Parameter estimation is an intuitive ap-
proach of determining multiplicative faults. The dynamic parameters of the system
are estimated and compared with the nominal values of a fault-free system model.
Parameter Estimation is more reliable than analytical redundancy methods, but it
requires more computational power and external excitation.
– Recursive least squares [22] - The Recursive least squares (RLS) filter is an
algorithm which recursively finds the filter coefficients that minimize a weighted
linear least squares cost function relating to the input signals.
– Regression analysis [21] - The method looks at the relationship between diffe-
rent dependent and independent variables to find the best suited set of parameters
that describe this relationship. The least square method mentioned above is one
of the many regression analysis techniques available for parameter estimation.
• Parity space techniques [7]: The parity space relations are the relationships found
between the inputs and outputs of a system and are used as residuals for the FDI
system. These relations are obtained from the system’s rearranged mathematical
model subject to a linear transformation. The design freedom obtained through the
transformation can be used to decouple disturbances and improve fault isolation.
– Input-Output based [8] - If the system can be described by a transfer function
relating the output to the input, then residuals can be created with this relation-
ship. The limitation of this method is that the number of sensors required must
be equal to or more than the number of faults hypothesis to diagnose the faults.
This is not the case with redundant actuators on a typical aircraft.
– State space based [23] - The output of a system is a function of the system
states, as well as the input to the system. If the null space to the observability
matrix can be obtained, then a relationship between the outputs and inputs of
the system can be found that is decoupled from the system states. The advantage
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of this approach over the basic input-output based approach is that more faults
can be diagnosed than the number of sensors on board the aircraft.
1.2.3 Existing Data and Empirical Findings
It is important to test theoretical principles on real-life situations to further our understan-
ding of the topic and offer practical solutions to everyday problems. It is also important to
compare the work done here with that done internationally so that the significance of this
research may be quantified.
The simulation results from most of the techniques discussed above were analysed. For the
RLS technique [22] a six-degree-of-freedom, F-16/MATV simulation was run. It shows that
the recursive least squares algorithm yields poor results when there is a poorly conditioned
observation matrix. It also shows that modifying the RLS to a modified sequential least
squares method, improves detection performance considerably.
In [20] it shows that the performance of a bank of Kalman filters (used in a multiple model
adaptive estimation scheme) is unacceptable if it is not tuned to some degree. Some of the
tuning methods that were proposed are: direct pseudo noise on the process noise covariance
matrix’s diagonal elements; direct pseudo noise on the measurement covariance matrix; and
tuning for actuator uncertainty. These methods increase the reliability of the detection at
the cost of required computing power. Another proposed method is given in [2] where a bank
of extended Kalman filters (EKF) is used instead of a bank of linear Kalman filters. The
algorithm, combined with an active supervision module, is shown to offer fast and accurate
FDI at the expense of additional processing power.
In all of the literature, extensive simulations were performed and in several instances test
were done on actual flights. Most methods discussed here used some sort of tuning method
or robust technique to enhance the reliability of the specific FDI method. There are also
several hybrid systems where more than one technique is incorporated that improves the
fault detection abilities. The results of this research are compared with literature in chapter
6.
1.2.4 Measuring Techniques and Instruments for Hypotheses Testing
Accurate simulations can be used as a preliminary measuring tool. In [5] a FTC system
is tested on a model that represents the lateral-directional dynamics of a McDonnell F-
4C Phantom flying at Mach 0.6 at an altitude of 35 000 ft. Other methods for testing
specific signals include the evaluation of the residual vectors in [9] by using a cumulative
sum (CUSUM) or a Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) test. MATLAB® is also an excellent
simulation tool. The three simulation cases in [24] were performed in MATLAB® 6.1 running
on a 800 MHz Pentium III computer.
At the ESL MATLAB® R2008b is available on an Intel® Core™ i5 CPU @ 2.8 GHz with 4.0
GB RAM. This program will be used extensively to simulate the dynamics of the aircraft
and the performance of the FDI methods.
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For the practical flight tests in this research a Meraka Modular UAV, that was developed
at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), will be used. The aircraft is
equipped with several sensors in its avionics that are used for state estimation purposes.
Several of the sensors’ data will be used as an input to the FDI process. The sensors
incorporated by the avionics on board the Meraka Modular UAV are:
• Accelerometers & rate gyros - A High Precision tri-axis Inertial Sensor from Analog
Devices will be used (model number ADIS16350).
• GPS - A Novatel differential GPS system will be used.
• Angle-of-attack & side-slip angle sensor - The 100400 Mini Air data boom from Space
Age Control will be used to measure both the angle of attack and sideslip angles.
• Static-pitot tube - The 100400 Mini Air data boom also houses a pitot tube used to
determine the static pressure and the airspeed of the UAV.
The mathematical model and other details of the aircraft will be discussed in chapter 2.
1.3 Research Problem and Objectives
There is a need at the ESL for FDI systems for their unmanned automated technology such
as the Meraka Modular UAV. The Meraka Modular UAV can be used as a test-bed for the
development of a suitable FDI. It should then be possible to use the FDI on other unmanned
vehicles by changing a minimum number of parameters. The other vehicles at the ESL will
then be able to benefit from the FDI system developed in this research with minimal extra
effort.
By creating more than one FDI system the advantages and disadvantages of the systems can
be compared, combined and a great deal of understanding can sprout from the evaluation.
In section 1.2.2 it was noted that there are three main methodologies for designing an FDI
in a model based, quantitative manner. However the faults that will be focused on are
categorised as additive faults (see section 1.2.2) and consequently a parameter estimation
methodology cannot be used and leaves only the state estimator and parity space method.
One FDI method in each of these two categories will be used to develop independent FDI
systems.
The Kalman filter based method is an attractive technique as the estimators aim to produce
optimal estimates. Some statistical information regarding the sensors and processes of the
aircraft are known and can be used by the Kalman filters. Extended Kalman filters are
also used in the state estimation processes incorporated by the ESL on their vehicles. The
literature is rich in articles and dissertations covering linear and extended Kalman filter
based FDI systems and makes for excellent material for comparison [25].
Both the input-output and state space methods, which fall under the parity space based ap-
proach, are covered in [8]. The input-output based method is an excellent FDI development
method, but problems arise when more faults can occur than the number of useful detection
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sensors. If this is the case the state space based method can be used and allows for more
design freedom with the use of optimisation techniques.
The research problem can therefore be stated as the problem of delivering reliable informa-
tion regarding the current state of the aircraft actuators. This information can then be used
to determine the optimal control allocation for the UAV. The objectives of this research will
be categorised as follows:
• Creating two fault detection and isolation systems using two of the techniques men-
tioned in the literature review.
• Making both systems usable in the FTC architecture developed in the ESL for the
Meraka Modular UAV at Stellenbosch University.
• Testing the system in both a simulation environment and actual test flight environ-
ment.
• Analysing and comparing the two FDI methods.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter one gave an introduction to where fault detection and isolation finds itself in the
general architecture of a fault tolerant control scheme. A brief literature review covered
the basic concepts and philosophies regarding fault tolerant control and fault detection and
isolation. The chapter was concluded with the research problem and the objectives of the
research.
Chapter two is concerned with deriving the necessary mathematics that will be used in
the research. This involves setting up all the required conventions and investigating the
dynamics of the Meraka Modular UAV.
Chapter three introduces the development of the first FDI process that incorporates the use
of a bank of Kalman filters. The linear Kalman filters will also be replaced by extended Kal-
man filters, thereby improving the FDI system. The chapter will conclude with simulation
results that show the expected performance of the bank of Kalman filters FDI method.
Chapter four describes the development of the second FDI process that uses a parity space
approach to create the residuals that will be used for FDI. The method will be optimised
for fault detection and isolation whereafter a CUSUM procedure will be introduced, which
assists the decision making process. Finally performance simulations and conclusions re-
garding this method are presented.
Chapter five is concerned with the test flight conducted at the Helderberg Radio Flyers Club,
which tested the performance of both the FDI methods. The physical aircraft actuators and
their effects on the expected performance of the FDI are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter six compares the two FDI methods and draws conclusions from the simulated
results and flight tests that were conducted. Lastly, the FDI performance is compared to
other literature simulations.
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Chapter seven provides valuable recommendations regarding practical considerations and
proposed future research and applications. The research conclusions completes the end of
the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Aircraft Model
For a quantitative model based FDI approach, a transfer function or state space repre-
sentation of the aircraft is required. In order to obtain this, it is first necessary to obtain
the equations of motion for the aircraft. To derive the non-linear aircraft model, specific
assumptions must be made and several reference frames defined. In this chapter the inertial,
body and wind frames, as well as the gravitational, aerodynamic and thrust model used to
describe the non-linear aircraft dynamics for the Meraka Modular UAV, will be defined.
2.1 Reference Frames Definitions
There are three reference frames that must be defined in order to develop a simple six degree
of freedom, non-linear model for the aircraft dynamics [26]. The first is the inertial reference
frame in which the laws of Newton are applicable. The second is the body reference frame
that coincides with the aircraft frame, and lastly the wind frame that describes the direction
of airflow over the body of the aircraft.
2.1.1 Inertial Reference Frame
In this research, the earth will be regarded as flat and non-rotating and can therefore be
regarded as an inertial reference frame. This is an acceptable approximation as the motion
of the Modular UAV will be localised and be relatively slow (22 m/s). This simplifies the
dynamic model for the aircraft quite substantially without significant loss of accuracy [3] for
the purpose of FDI. The frame is defined as fixed to the earth at some convenient location
such as the starting centre of gravity (CG) point of the aircraft before take-off. The x-axis is
pointed north, whereas the y-axis points east and the z-axis points downwards to complete
the right-hand convention. This definition is depicted in figure 2.1. The subscript used for
the inertial reference frame will be I.
12
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Figure 2.1: Inertial reference frame.
2.1.2 Body Reference Frame
The body reference frame is required so that the forces and moments can be mapped in
a logical manner to the resulting motions of the aircraft. The centre point of the frame
coincides with the CG of the aircraft. This is not always the case, but it is generally placed
at the CG and will be done this way in this research.
The x-axis points forward and comes out the nose of the aircraft, while the y-axis points out
along the right wing as seen in figure 2.2. It must be noted that the x-axis does not coincide
with one of the principal axes of the aircraft. Instead it coincides with the originally aligned
equilibrium direction of the velocity vector of the aircraft [27]. The z-axis completes the
right-hand convention by pointing downwards so that the xb-zb-plane is the aircraft’s plane
of symmetry. The convention is also shown in figure 2.2. The subscript used for the body
reference frame will be b.
Figure 2.2: Body reference frame with velocity notations.
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2.1.3 Wind Reference Frame
The wind frame is sometimes also referred to as the stability frame or the aerodynamic
frame [28]. The aerodynamic forces that act on the body of the aircraft are produced by the
air flowing over the airframe. The air flow velocity is described by V and the direction of V
can be described by two angles relative to the body frame of the aircraft. The two angles
are the angle of attack, α, and side slip angle, β. These angles parameterises the change
in the air flow pattern over the airframe that consequently produces different aerodynamic
forces and moments.
Figure 2.3: Wind reference frame, angle of attack and side slip angle, α > 0 and β > 0.
The wind reference frame can be defined by lining up the xw-axis with the velocity vector,
V. As shown in figure 2.3 the angle of attack (α) is the angle between the projection of
V onto the xb-zb-plane and the xb-axis. The side slip angle (β) is the angle between the
projection of the airspeed vector V onto the xb-zb-plane and the airspeed vector itself [2].
The y-axis and z-axis of the wind reference frame are directed according to these angles as
illustrated in figure 2.3. The subscript used for the wind reference frame will be w.
2.2 Notation
The components of the total instantaneous values of the linear velocities resolved into the
body reference frame are
• U - Forward velocity
• V - Lateral velocity
• W - Downward velocity
and the angular rates are
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. AIRCRAFT MODEL 15
• P - Angular rate around the xb-axis
• Q - Angular rate around the yb-axis
• R - Angular rate around the zb-axis
These vectors are shown in figure 2.2.
The notation that will be used for the forces and moments acting on the body of the aircraft
is provided in figure 2.4. The forces are
• X - Axial force
• Y - Lateral force
• Z - Normal force
and the moments are
• L - Rolling moment
• M - Pitching moment
• N - Yawing moment
There are eight control surfaces consisting of two ailerons, two flaps, two rudders and two
elevators. The control surface deflection angles are δA, δE , δF , δR respectively. A distinction
will be made between the left and right actuator by adding an l or r suffix to the subscript
according to whether it is left or right (such as δAr is the right aileron) as seen from behind
the aircraft. Figure 2.4 shows the control surfaces and their deflections, where a negative
deflection causes a positive moment around the body reference frame.
Figure 2.4: Body reference frame with force and moment notations.
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Figure 2.5: Euler angle transformation sequence (3,2,1) in 3D [1].
2.3 Frame Transformations
The aerodynamics of the aircraft are best described in the wind reference frame while the
gravitational forces and thrust are described better in the body frame. The position and
attitude of the aircraft are however expressed in the inertial reference frame. It is therefore
important that vectors should be able to be mapped from one reference frame to another.
There are several methods to accomplish this, but three methods worth noting are by using
rotation matrices, Euler angles and quaternions. In this research, Euler angles will be
used and converted to rotation matrices. Quaternions have benefits (see section 2.3.5) but
the control system for the Meraka Modular UAV was developed without their use and
subsequently will not be used for the FDI system.
2.3.1 Euler Angles
Using Euler angles is a simple and understandable method used for frame transformation
and is therefore a popular choice [1]. The Euler angle transformation is parameterised by
three consecutive rotations. There are several different possible non-commutable rotation
sequences to describe a specific transformation. The sequence that will be used in this
research is the Euler 3-2-1 rotation sequence. This sequence is the same as what is used in
the other systems developed at the ESL [3].
In the case of the aircraft attitude the inertial reference frame will be the starting frame
and the body frame of the aircraft will be the transformed frame. The angles Ψ, Θ and Φ
are called the yaw, pitch and roll angles respectively and they are displayed in figure 2.6
in order of rotation sequence from left to right. This parameterisation has singularities at
pitch values of Θ = npi+ pi2 for n ∈ Z [1]. At these points, changes in yaw and roll constitute
the same motion. This should however not be problematic in the context of this research as
it is assumed that the aircraft stays within |Θ|  pi2 .
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Figure 2.6: Euler angles and the frame transformation.
2.3.2 Rotation Matrices
The Euler angles described in section 2.3.1 are helpful but do not work well with column
vectors. To solve this problem Euler angles are converted to rotation matrices that can
readily be applied to column vectors to transform them from one reference frame to another.
When cI is taken as a column vector in the inertial reference frame and cb is taken as a
column vector in the body reference frame, the Euler 3-2-1 sequence is realised by [1]
cI = R321cb (2.3.1)
where R321 =
 cΘcΨ cΘsΨ −sΘsΦsΘcΨ − cΦsΨ sΦsΘsΨ + cΦcΨ cΘsΦ
cΦsΘcΨ + sΦsΨ cΦsΘsΨ − sΦcΨ cΘcΦ
 (2.3.2)
and sx = sin x (2.3.3)
cx = cosx (2.3.4)
The matrix R321 is also called the direction cosine matrix (DCM). It is shown in [1] that
the inverse of R321 transforms the body frame to the inertial frame and that the inverse is
also equal to its transpose.
2.3.3 Position and Attitude Dynamics
The position of the airplane can be described by the aircraft’s North, East and downward
position. The dynamics of these positions are given by [29]N˙E˙
D˙
 =
cΨcΘ cΨsΘsΦ − sΨcΦ cΨsΘcΦ + sΨsΦsΨcΘ sΨsΘsΦ + cΨcΦ sΨsΘcΦ − cΨsΦ
−sΘ cΘsΦ cΘcΦ

UV
W
 (2.3.5)
where
cx = cosx (2.3.6)
sx = sin x (2.3.7)
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The time rate of change of the Euler angles with respect to the other kinematic states are
governed by the derivation found in [26] asΦ˙Θ˙
Ψ˙
 =
1 sin Φ tan Θ cos Φ tan Θ0 cos Φ − sin Φ
0 sin Φ sec Θ cos Φ sec Θ

PQ
R
 Θ 6= npi + pi2 n ∈ Z (2.3.8)
2.3.4 Velocity Transformations
It is helpful to break down the velocity vector V into its body-referenced components using
the angle of attack and side slip angles, and vice versa. The components can be determined
by investigating figure 2.3 asUV
W
 =
cos(β) cos(α)cos(β) sin(α)
sin(β)
 |V| (2.3.9)
and vice versa
α = arctan
(
W
U
)
β = arctan
(
V
U cos(α)
) }U 6= 0 (2.3.10)
2.3.5 Quaternions
An unwanted consequence of using Euler angles is the singularity at Θ = npi+ pi2 for n ∈ Z.
Quaternions are superior to Euler angles in that they do not display this singularity; however
a quaternion transformation between two reference frames is described by four parameters
instead of three. As stated previously, quaternions will not be used in this research, so that
it conforms to the systems being developed for the Meraka Modular UAV at the ESL. In [1]
it is shown that quaternions, Euler angles and rotation matrices can be used interchangeably
should the need arise to do so.
2.4 Assumptions
There are six assumptions that must be made before deriving the equations of motion [27]:
1. The axes xb and zb lie in the plane of symmetry of the aircraft and the products of
inertia Ixy and Iyz are equal to zero. The direction of xb is generally not along a
principal axis, hence Ixz 6= 0. For the aircraft used in this research however, the
inertia tensor element Ixz is negligible compared to the rest of the elements.
2. The mass of the aircraft remains constant throughout the dynamic analysis. In practice
this is not true as there can be cargo such as equipment, ammunition and projectiles
loading and unloading during the course of the flight. There is also the inevitable
consumption of fuel in most aircraft that reduces the mass of the aircraft during flight.
The Meraka Modular UAV uses battery powered motors and no in-flight loading or
unloading is done. Therefore the assumption of constant mass is accurate.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. AIRCRAFT MODEL 19
3. The aircraft is a rigid body. This means that any two points on or within the aircraft
will remain stationary relative to one another. This greatly simplifies the equations of
motion.
4. The earth is an inertial reference, and unless otherwise stated, the atmosphere is fixed
with respect to the earth. This assumption is valid for the purpose of this research as it
is generally accepted that the gyros and accelerometers on the aircraft cannot discern
the angular velocity or accelerations of the earth (not to be confused with gravitational
acceleration).
5. The perturbations from equilibrium state are small. With this assumption products
of small variations can be ignored and small angle assumptions can be made for the
relative angles between the equilibrium and disturbed axes. This assumption has
been very successful in simplifying the linearisation process without too much loss of
accuracy [26].
6. The airflow over the body of the aircraft is quasi-steady. Quasi-steady flow assumes
the airflow changes instantaneously when the aircraft is disturbed from its equilibrium.
This assumption is adequate for low Mach numbers (<0.8) and allows all derivatives
with respect to the rates of change of velocities to be omitted when setting up an
aerodynamic model of the aircraft.
2.5 Equations of Rigid-Body Motion
In the development of the equations of rigid-body motion, the assumption will be made
that the aircraft will be flying in a localised area at low velocity. The flat-earth, non-
rotating inertial reference frame simplifies these equations as the effects due to the Coriolis
acceleration and centripetal acceleration of the earth can be ignored. In the inertial reference
frame the laws of Newton apply.
2.5.1 Equations of Forces
The translation of a rigid body is described by its momentum. Newton’s second law relates
the change of momentum (the product of the velocity of its CG and its mass) to an external
force acting on the body. This is stated as: the summation of all the forces acting on a rigid
body equals the time rate of change of its momentum [30]. It can be written as∑
j
Fj =
(
dpb
dt
)
I
(2.5.1)
= d
dt
(mVb)I (2.5.2)
where j represents all the forces acting on the aircraft and pb is the momentum. The forces
are however acting on the rotating body of the aircraft and it would be convenient to have
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equation 2.5.2 in terms of the body reference frame. The relation then becomes [30]∑
j
Fj =
d
dt
(mVb)b + Ωb × pb (2.5.3)
= d
dt
(mVb)b + Ωb × (mVb) (2.5.4)
where Ωb is the angular velocity vector of the aircraft.
2.5.2 Equations of Moments
The rotation of a rigid body is described by its angular motion. Newton’s second law can
be used to relate the change in angular velocity to the sum of external moments acting on
the aircraft body. This can be more formally stated as: the summation of all the moments
acting on a rigid body equals the time rate of change of its angular momentum [30]. It can
be written as ∑
j
Mj =
(
dHb
dt
)
I
(2.5.5)
= d
dt
(ΩIb)I (2.5.6)
where Hb is the angular momentum and the angular rate vector
Ω =
PQ
R
 (2.5.7)
and Ib is the mass moment of inertia tensor that is written as
Ib =
 Ixx −Ixy −Ixz−Iyz Iyy −Iyz
−Izx −Izy Izz
 (2.5.8)
According to the first assumption from section 2.4, the inertia tensor can be greatly simplified
into the diagonal matrix
Ib =
Ixx 0 00 Iyy 0
0 0 Izz
 (2.5.9)
For the same reason as with the external forces, it would be convenient to write equation
2.5.6 in terms of the body reference frame. The relation then becomes [30]∑
j
Mj =
(
dHb
dt
)
b
+ Ωb × (Hb) (2.5.10)
= d
dt
(ΩIb)b + Ωb × (ΩbIb) (2.5.11)
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2.5.3 General Equations
The two equations (Eq. 2.5.4 and Eq. 2.5.11) are written in vector form. If the assumption
holds for a symmetrical aircraft body around the xb-zb-plane, these two equations can be
expanded into their scalar forms to produce
X = m(U˙ +WQ− V R) (2.5.12)
Y = m(V˙ + UR−WP ) (2.5.13)
Z = m(W˙ + V P − UQ) (2.5.14)
L = P˙ Ixx +QR(Izz − Iyy) (2.5.15)
M = Q˙Iyy + PR(Ixx − Izz) (2.5.16)
N = R˙Izz + PQ(Iyy − Ixx) (2.5.17)
Each of the equations 2.5.12 to 2.5.17 are composed of aerodynamic, thrust and gravitational
forces and moments so that
X = Xa +Xt +Xg (2.5.18)
Y = Ya + Yt + Yg (2.5.19)
Z = Za + Zt + Zg (2.5.20)
L = La + Lt + Lg (2.5.21)
M = Ma +Mt +Mg (2.5.22)
L = La +Nt +Ng (2.5.23)
2.6 Aerodynamic Forces and Moments
In this research it is assumed that the aerodynamic stability and control derivatives will be
made available by the system identification process running on the aircraft’s computer or
from off-line parameter estimation techniques. Therefore the research will not be accom-
panied by an in-depth analysis of these derivatives. Further reading on this topic can be
found in [3; 31; 28; 26; 27]. However, a brief explanation of the analysis will be presented.
Aerodynamic forces and moments are produced by a pressure difference over the airfoils of
the aircraft. Actuators assist in changing the airflow over the airfoil surface to induce certain
desired forces and moments. Because air pressure is the driving force behind these dynamics,
Bernoulli’s equation and the continuity principle for incompressible fluids are fundamental.
It states that the sum of the static (pstatic) and dynamic pressure (q = 0.5ρ|V|2) stay
constant
pstatic +
1
2ρ|V|
2 = C (2.6.1)
where |V| is the free stream velocity.
It can be shown [31] that the resultant aerodynamic force (and moment) is proportional to
the product of the dynamic pressure and the airfoil area (S).
F ∝ 12ρ|V|
2S (2.6.2)
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The moments are proportional to the product of the corresponding forces and relevant
moment arms. The problem becomes finding the dimensionless coefficients of proportionality
so that
Xa = CX
(
1
2ρ|V|
2S
)
(2.6.3)
Ya = CY
(
1
2ρ|V|
2S
)
(2.6.4)
Za = CZ
(
1
2ρ|V|
2S
)
(2.6.5)
La = CL
(
1
2ρ|V|
2S
)
b (2.6.6)
Ma = CM
(
1
2ρ|V|
2S
)
c (2.6.7)
Na = CN
(
1
2ρ|V|
2S
)
b (2.6.8)
where the moment arms b and c are the wingspan and mean aerodynamic chord respectively.
For the FDI analysis undertaken in this research, preliminary stability and control derivatives
were determined using a program called Athena Vortex Lattice (AVL). AVL is a software
program for aerodynamic and flight-dynamic analysis of rigid aircraft of arbitrary confi-
guration developed at MIT. The values obtained through AVL corresponded well to wind
tunnel results obtained by the CSIR (see section 2.9). With reference to [31; 27], before the
aerodynamic forces can be applied to the aircraft in the body frame, a transformation of
the drag and lift onto CX and CZ are required.
CX = −Cd cosα+ Cl sinα (2.6.9)
CZ = −Cd sinα− Cl cosα (2.6.10)
Expanding the various coefficients produces
Cd = Cd0 +
C2l
piAe
(2.6.11)
Cl = Cl0 + Clαα+Clββ +
b
2|V|ClPP +
c
2|V|ClQQ+
b
2|V|ClRR+ Clδδ (2.6.12)
CY =CY0 +CYαα+ CYββ +
b
2|V|CYPP +
c
2|V|CYQQ+
b
2|V|CYRR+ CYδδ (2.6.13)
CL =CL0 +CLαα+ CLββ +
b
2|V|CLPP +
c
2|V|CLQQ+
b
2|V|CLRR+ CLδδ (2.6.14)
CM = CM0 + CMαα+CMββ +
b
2|V|CMPP +
c
2|V|CMQQ+
b
2|V|CMRR+ CMδδ (2.6.15)
CN =CN0 +CNαα+ CNββ +
b
2|V|CNPP +
c
2|V|CNQQ+
b
2|V|CNRR+ CNδδ (2.6.16)
where the actuator vector
δ =
[
δAr δAl δEr δEl δFr δFl δRr δRl
]T
(2.6.17)
represents the actuator deflections for the left and right ailerons, elevators, flaps and rudders.
A and e are the aspect ratio of the wing and the Oswald efficiency factor respectively. Most
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of the terms in equations 2.6.11 to 2.6.16 can be ignored [31] as indicated by the crossed
out terms in these equations. The terms relating the actuator commands to the forces and
moments are called the control derivatives (Clδ , CYδ , CLδ , CMδ and CNδ) while the rest
are called stability derivatives.
The values for the derivatives that were obtained using AVL can be found in Appendix A.
2.7 Gravitational Forces and Moments
The gravitational model is assumed to create a uniform and constant force acting on the
aircraft in the direction to the centre of the Earth. It is also assumed that the aircraft is
small enough that no moment is created by the fluctuations in the gravitational field acting
upon the aircraft. The components of the gravity force along the body reference frame
are [27]:
Xg = −mg sin Θ (2.7.1)
Yg = mg cos Θ sin Φ (2.7.2)
Zg = mg cos Θ cos Φ (2.7.3)
Lg = Mg = Ng = 0 (2.7.4)
2.8 Engine Forces and Moments
The Meraka Modular UAV has two engines that are positioned symmetrically to one another
around the xb-zb-plane and their rotors point in the xb direction. The on board computer
(OBC) of the aircraft controls the engines in such a way that the thrust generated by the
rotors are equal. The total thrust vector is also assumed to run close enough through the CG
so that any moments produced by the rotors are negligible. The resulting thrust equations
are
Xt u T (2.8.1)
0 = Yt = Zt = Lt = Nt = Mt (2.8.2)
where T is the thrust magnitude.
2.9 Change in Aircraft Coefficients
Most aircraft control systems are designed to be robust to changes in aircraft coefficients.
It is important to investigate whether empirical tests correspond with the mathematical
model developed earlier so that the susceptibility of FDI error can be minimised in flight
tests later.
The Defence, Peace, Safety and Security department at the CSIR in South Africa has done
a number of wind tunnel tests on the Meraka Modular UAV. A scale model of the aircraft
was placed in a wind tunnel and tested at different angles of α and β. The resulting
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aerodynamic coefficients were recorded. The most important coefficients that were analysed
were the coefficients Cd, Cl, Cy, CL, CM , CN from equations 2.6.11 to 2.6.16.
The single set of trim stability derivatives obtained through AVL was used in MATLAB®
to find the solution to the aerodynamic coefficients while changing the values for α and β.
The different results for all the coefficients are shown in figures 2.7 to 2.12. Note that in the
mathematical model the coefficients Cd, Cl, CM are not dependent on β and the coefficients
Cy, CL, CN are not dependent on α.
In figure 2.7 the drag coefficient (Cd) is clearly seen to be quadratically dependent on α.
It must be noted that Cd is quadratically dependent on α but significantly less on β. It
should be borne in mind that the amplitude of the sideslip angle is usually less than angles
of attack because of faster lateral poles relating to yaw rate. It can also be seen that for a
positive angle of attack there is a good correspondence between the simulated and empirical
values. The increase in the discrepancy when the angle of attack becomes negative is due to
the fact that the MATLAB® solution is calculated with a single set of derivatives obtained
in AVL, with the AVL simulation being run around a trim condition with positive angle
of attack. More importantly, AVL does not take into account the change in parasitic drag.
The parasitic drag of the UAV changes as the frontal area of the UAV changes, which can
be described as a change in the angle of attack.
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
α [in degrees] 
C
d
 
 
β ˚ = -8
β ˚ = -4
β ˚ = 0
β ˚ = 4
β ˚ = 8
MATLAB value for all β 
}Wind tunneltest results
Figure 2.7: The effect of α on the aerodynamic coefficient Cd.
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Figure 2.8: The effect of α on the aerodynamic coefficient Cl.
In figure 2.8 the independence of Cl in terms of β is clearly seen. The simulated values as
well as the slope correspond well to the empirical values obtained through wind tunnel tests.
For FDI analysis the parasitic drag coefficient is of minimal importance. The effect of an
actuator failure has little effect on parasitic drag, even if an actuator fault can increase the
overall drag force of the aircraft.
The scatter of empirical values in figure 2.9 can be attributed to the small variations in
collected data from the wind tunnel test, a non-perfect test setup and/or an aircraft with
non-perfect symmetry around the xb-zb-plane. If the test had been perfect in all aspects,
CY would have been zero for all values of α as β = 0. This is different from what is observed
in figure 2.9, but the empirical results still correspond well to the simulated values.
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Figure 2.9: The effect of β on the aerodynamic coefficient CY .
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Figure 2.10: The effect of β on the aerodynamic coefficient CL.
In figure 2.10 the effects of a non-perfect wind tunnel are evident in the non-zero value of
CL at β = 0. The results are still satisfactory as the slope of the simulation and empirical
values are very similar.
Pitching moment and angle of attack are both defined positive as the nose of the aircraft
pitches up. The negative slope of figure 2.11 therefore indicates the stabilising effect that
the pitching moment has on α. The slope of the empirical data in figure 2.11 matches well
with the simulated values.
Yawing moment is defined as a moment that tends to rotate the aircraft in a clockwise
manner (looked at from above), whereas β is defined positive if the aircraft is rotated anti-
clockwise in terms of the direction of airflow. The positive slope of figure 2.12 therefore
indicates the stabilising effect that the yawing moment has on β. The data in figure 2.12
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Figure 2.11: The effect of α on the aerodynamic coefficient CM .
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Figure 2.12: The effect of β on the aerodynamic coefficient CN .
corresponds well with the simulated values.
2.10 Final Set of Non-Linear Differential Equations
This chapter thus far was concerned with establishing the required non-linear equations
of motion and accompanying conventions and notations for the dynamics of the Meraka
Modular UAV. The resulting equations are rewritten in terms of the rate of change of the
twelve states of the system.
U˙ = X
m
+ V R−WQ (2.10.1)
V˙ = Y
m
− UR+WP (2.10.2)
W˙ = Z
m
+ UQ− V P (2.10.3)
P˙ = 1
Ixx
(L−QR(Izz − Iyy)) (2.10.4)
Q˙ = 1
Iyy
(M − PR(Ixx − Izz)) (2.10.5)
R˙ = 1
Izz
(N − PQ(Iyy − Ixx)) (2.10.6)
Φ˙ = P +Q(sΦtΘ) +R(sΦtΘ) (2.10.7)
Θ˙ = Q(cΘ)−R(sΦ) (2.10.8)
Ψ˙ = Q(sΦeΘ) +R(cΦeΘ) (2.10.9)
N˙ = U(cΨcΘ) + V (cΨsΘsΦ − sΨcΦ) +W (cΨsΘcΦ + sΨsΦ) (2.10.10)
E˙ = U(sΨcΘ) + V (sΨsΘsΦ + cΨcΦ) +W (sΨsΘcΦ − cΨsΦ) (2.10.11)
D˙ = −U(sΘ) + V (cΘsΦ) +W (cΘcΦ) (2.10.12)
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where
sx = sin(x) (2.10.13)
cx = cos(x) (2.10.14)
tx = tan(x) (2.10.15)
ex = sec(x) (2.10.16)
Note that the velocity and angular rate states are described in the body reference frame,
while the position and attitude states are described in the inertial reference frame. The
linearisation and decoupling of the dynamics will be dealt with in the next section.
2.11 Linearising the Mathematical Model
The two FDI methods developed in this research required a set of linear differential or
difference equations. However, the mathematical model developed in this chapter thus far
is non-linear. Therefore the system has to be linearised around a working point.
The mathematical model derived in this chapter shows that six simultaneous nonlinear
equations (equations 2.5.12 to 2.5.17), together with equations 2.3.5 and 2.3.8, describe
the forces and moments that influence the motion of a rigid aircraft. These equations are
written in terms of the twelve state derivatives to obtain equations 2.10.1 to 2.10.12. When
linearising these state differential equations, 2.10.9 to 2.10.12 are omitted, because the states
Ψ, N , E and D do not recouple back into the dynamics of the aircraft, as can be seen by
their absence in equations 2.10.1 to 2.10.8. The state and input vectors are chosen from
these equations as
x =
[
U V W P Q R Φ Θ
]T
(2.11.1)
u =
[
δ
T
]
(2.11.2)
and the resulting differential equations are
U˙ = X
m
+ V R−WQ (2.11.3)
V˙ = Y
m
− UR+WP (2.11.4)
W˙ = Z
m
+ UQ− V P (2.11.5)
P˙ = 1
Ixx
(L−QR(Izz − Iyy)) (2.11.6)
Q˙ = 1
Iyy
(M − PR(Ixx − Izz)) (2.11.7)
R˙ = 1
Izz
(N − PQ(Iyy − Ixx)) (2.11.8)
Φ˙ = P +Q sin(Φ) tan(Θ) +R sin(Φ) tan(Θ) (2.11.9)
Θ˙ = Q cos(Θ)−R sin(Φ) (2.11.10)
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which can be written in compact form as
x˙ = f(x,u) (2.11.11)
where
x =
[
U V W P Q R Φ Θ
]T
(2.11.12)
u =
[
δ
T
]
(2.11.13)
With reference to equations 2.11.3 to 2.11.10, the aircraft can be described as a system with
smooth non-linearities that is continuously differentiable. For such a model, a linear model
can be computed around a small localised equilibrium working-point that is valid for small
perturbations. The aim will be to rewrite the non-linear set of equations (equation 2.11.11)
in the linear form:
x˙ = Ax + Bu (2.11.14)
For small signal linearisation the states and inputs are expanded as the sum of their working
point values and the perturbation around the working point as
x = x¯ + ∆x (2.11.15)
u = u¯ + ∆u (2.11.16)
where the state perturbations will be written as lower case letters and Greek symbols to
clarify the difference between them and the absolute states:
∆x =
[
u v w p q r φ θ
]T
(2.11.17)
∆u =
[
∆δ
∆T
]
(2.11.18)
When equations 2.11.15 and 2.11.16 are substituted into equation 2.11.11, the expansion
yields an expanding Taylor series
˙¯x + ∆x˙ = f(x¯ + ∆x, u¯ + ∆u) (2.11.19)
= f(x¯, u¯) + ∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
wp
∆x + ∂f
∂u
∣∣∣∣
wp
∆u + higher order terms (2.11.20)
= f(x¯, u¯) + Awp∆x + Bwp∆u + higher order terms (2.11.21)
where the subscript “wp” means the evaluation at the working point and
Awp =
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
wp
(2.11.22)
Bwp =
∂f
∂u
∣∣∣∣
wp
(2.11.23)
can be thought of the best linear fit to the nonlinear function x˙ = f(x,u) ≈ Ax + Bu.
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Ignoring the higher order terms that are negligible, while noting ˙¯x = f(x¯, u¯) = 0, the
dynamics of the system can be described by
∆x˙ = Awp∆x + Bwp∆u (2.11.24)
which is a continuous state space approximation of a set of nonlinear equations around a
specified working point.
The linearisation problem now becomes one of finding the partial derivatives that constitute
the elements inAwp andBwp. Before this process is continued some simplifying assumptions
are made specifically for actuator FDI.
From appendix A and section 2.6, note that the actuators have no apparent effect on three
of the eight states defined in equations 2.11.3 to 2.11.10. The states that are not affected by
the actuators are velocity, yaw and pitch. The FDI will therefore only be interested in the
differential equations (and therefore the partial derivatives) relating the actuator inputs to
the remaining five states. These states are p, q, r, w and v. This reduced state vector greatly
simplifies the FDI and therefore reduces the processing power required on-board without
losing significant performance. The rest of the states that are not included can still be
accurately estimated on-board with conventional estimators. The new reduced state vector
becomes
∆x =
[
p q r w v
]T
(2.11.25)
All the resulting information for calculating the partial derivatives are contained in the
equations for aerodynamic forces and moments (equations 2.6.9 to 2.6.16). The first problem
encountered is that the two states, w and v, are not explicitly used in the aerodynamic
equations. This can be rectified by using equation 2.3.10 and noting that α and β are
measureable. Then according to the small angle assumption made in section 2.4
α = arctan
(
W
U
)
(2.11.26)
= arctan
(
W
|V|wp cos(β) cos(α)
)
(2.11.27)
≈ W|V|wp (2.11.28)
β = arctan
(
V
U
cos(α)
)
(2.11.29)
= arctan
(
V
|V|wp cos(β) cos(α) cos(α)
)
(2.11.30)
≈ V|V|wp (2.11.31)
The state vector is then changed by substituting α and β for w and v respectively, resulting
in a new state vector:
∆x =
[
p q r α β
]T
(2.11.32)
Using equations 2.11.22 and 2.11.23 as a guide, the matrices Awp and Bwp are expanded
into the matrices contained in appendix B.1, equation B.1.1. The calculations of the partial
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derivatives in equation B.1.1 are found in appendix B.2 and the linearised state matrices
can be found in appendix B.3.
2.12 Discretising the State Space Representation
Both FDI methods developed in this research are discrete recursive processes and will be
implemented on digital computers. The continuous state space representations of equation
B.3.1 must therefore be discretised into the form
xk+1 = Fxk + Guk (2.12.1)
yk = Hxk (2.12.2)
where yk is the measurement vector, H is the measurement matrix and the subscript k
denotes the time step.
Assuming a zero-order hold digital process, the discrete state space matrices become [32]
F = eAT (2.12.3)
G =
(∫ T
0
eAηdη
)
B (2.12.4)
H = C (2.12.5)
where C is the continuous measurement matrix and T is the time step length.
The extended Kalman filter must be able to linearise and discretise the state space matrices
at each time step. The discretisation proposed above may be intractable due to the heavy
matrix exponential and integral operations. A discrete approximation for the state space
representation can be found by expanding equation 2.12.3 [32]:
F = eAT (2.12.6)
= I + AT + A
2T 2
2! +
A3T 3
3! + . . . (2.12.7)
≈ I + AT (2.12.8)
The higher order terms can be ignored as they become significantly smaller as the power of
T increases. This is due to the small time step used in the digital computer.
Using the same procedure, equation 2.12.4 can be approximated as
G ≈ TB (2.12.9)
The required mathematical model and linearised matrices are ready to be utilised in the
design and development of the two FDI processes.
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Chapter 3
First Fault Detection and Isolation
Method: A Bank of Kalman Filters
In this chapter a classic Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) [2] method for FDI
using a bank of Kalman filters will be investigated. Some limitations of this method will
be highlighted and a non-linear Extended Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (EMMAE)
method will be developed whereafter the advantages and disadvantages of the latter are
discussed.
In this method the measurement residual from each Kalman filter is used in combination
with its own residual covariance matrix to detect and isolate the fault. Each fault scenario
estimator (Kalman filter) is also modified so that it can estimate the particular actuator
deflection.
3.1 The Fault Detection and Isolation Architecture
The bank of Kalman filters is an estimator based method for FDI, which requires several
different models of the same aircraft system. The difference between the models is that each
one describes a different fault (or no-fault) scenario. The estimator bank is adaptive in the
sense that the final estimated state is calculated based on a weighting of the estimates that
describe each scenario. The dynamics of the bank of Kalman filters are therefore dependent
on the fault scenario in which the aircraft operates. The aircraft states can therefore still
be accurately estimated when a fault occurs.
The MMAE architecture is depicted in figure 3.1. Here each filter’s residual covariance ma-
trix, as well as its measurement residual, is sent to a probability computation that determines
each scenario’s probability. This probability is used as a weighting for the state estimate
from each filter to produce the best total state estimate. The probabilities are also used in
the failure decision-making process that will classify the current fault scenario.
From the eight actuators nine filters can be implemented (one filter for each fault and one
for the no-fault scenario) to achieve actuator fault detection. However, the flaps and ailerons
are physically similar (see figure 2.4) and therefore mathematically similar (see appendix
32
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Figure 3.1: Architecture for the bank of Kalman filters.
A). The flaps are also used as passive control surfaces only at landing and take-off. The
diagnosis of flap faults will therefore be ignored in this research. The control re-allocation
process in [3] however can use them as independent actuators, once a fault has occurred.
3.2 Designing the Kalman Filters
The Kalman filter is a recursive process in which information from the sensors and infor-
mation obtained from the mathematical propagation of the dynamics are merged. This is
done in an optimal way only if specific assumptions hold [33]. Some of these assumptions
are that the process is linear, the process and measurement noise must be white, normally
distributed, and the distribution parameters of the process and measurement noise must
be known. These assumptions do not strictly hold in a typical aircraft system, but are
reasonably acceptable in the engineering practice [20].
The state of the aircraft for each scenario will be predicted by the bank of Kalman filters,
where each filter is designed to resemble a particular fault (or no-fault) scenario. The
philosophy of this technique is that the filter that most closely resembles the true scenario
will have the smallest residuals and therefore be most likely to be the true scenario.
The first step of designing the Kalman filters is to obtain a mathematical model and linearise
it around a pre-defined working point. The linearising process was done previously in section
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2.11. For the bank of linear Kalman filters the trim condition will be chosen as the working
point. For the extended Kalman filters the state and input matrix will be linearised at each
time step. The second step is to modify each Kalman filter to resemble the fault scenario
for which it is responsible.
3.2.1 The Kalman Filter Equations
The development of the bank of Kalman filters will start by designing a bank of linear
Kalman filters. The linear Kalman filters will be constructed around the trim conditions of
the Meraka Modular UAV.
To determine the trim values the formulas written below (equations 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) can
be used bearing in mind the assumptions that the trim angle of attack is small (the fifth
assumption in section 2.4) and that the lift force is an order of magnitude greater than the
drag force.
The trim condition is calculated as the solution to the equilibrium problem given by the
desire of straight and level flight at a specific nominal velocity. The trim velocity is chosen
at 22 m/s [3]. The problem assumes a zero value for yaw, roll, sideslip, lateral velocity
and all angular rates. The solution then provides a value for the thrust force and elevator
deflections as well as the trim angle of attack and pitch angle. The formulas to determine
trim with these assumptions are [29][
α
δEr
]
T
=
[
CLα (CLδEr + CLδEl )
Cmα (CmδEr + CmδEl )
]−1 [ mg
qTS
− CL0
−Cm0
]
(3.2.1)
TT = qTSCDT cosαT − qTSCLT sinαT +mg sinαT (3.2.2)
where the subscript T denotes values evaluated at trim condition and
qT =
1
2ρ|V|
2
T (3.2.3)
and noting that at trim conditions δEl = δEr.
Each filter will have different values for the elements in their state, input, and measurement
matrices. The structure of the Kalman filter however remains the same and will be described
in this section. The linearised mathematical model (equation 2.12.1 and 2.12.2) will be
rewritten, but with added noise terms
xk+1 = Fxk + Guk + wk (3.2.4)
yk = Hxk + vk (3.2.5)
where yk is the current measurement, wk is the random process affecting the system states
and vk is the measurement noise from the sensors. The subscript k will resemble the k-th
time step.
The Kalman filter can be described by two processes running in series: firstly a mathematical
prediction step and secondly a measurement update step, if a measurement is available. The
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prediction step uses equation 3.2.4 to predict the next state value and the state covariance
matrix
xˆk|k−1 = Fkxˆk−1|k−1 + Gkuk (3.2.6)
Pk|k−1 = FkPk−1|k−1FTk + Qk (3.2.7)
In equations 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 the first part of the subscript (e.g. the k in xˆk|k−1) refers to
the time step in which prediction last occurred, whereas the second part (e.g. the k − 1
in Pk|k−1) refers to the time step in which an measurement update last occurred. The
state estimate covariance is predicted with the knowledge of the process noise statistical
information (equation 3.2.7).
The second process is an update on the predicted estimate, if a measurement is available.
The driving force in the update process is the residual, which is the difference between the
measured and predicted value
r˜k = yk −Hkxˆk|k−1 (3.2.8)
The residual covariance is calculated with knowledge of the measurement noise statistical
information:
Sk = HkPk|k−1HTk + Rk (3.2.9)
The Kalman gain is then calculated so that a statistically optimal weighting can be given
to both the predicted estimate and the measurement to produce a final estimate:
Kk = Pk|k−1HTk S−1k (3.2.10)
xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 + Kkr˜k (3.2.11)
The state estimate covariance is then also updated.
Pk|k = (I−KkHk)Pk|k−1 (3.2.12)
3.2.2 The Kalman Filter for the No-Fault Scenario
The Kalman filter is a discrete process that requires the covariance matrices of the process
and measurement noise that were determined from sensor data sheets and an analysis on the
flight dynamics with a wind model affecting the external forces acting on the aircraft. See
appendix C for more details on the derivation of the covariance matrices. For the no-fault
case the state matrices are just the discrete linearised matrices from equation 2.12.8 and
2.12.9 evaluated at the trim condition:
Fnf = FT (3.2.13)
Gnf = GT (3.2.14)
Qnf = E{wkwTk } (3.2.15)
Rnf = E{vkvTk } (3.2.16)
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In the Meraka Modular UAV there are sensors that directly measure all five of the required
states and therefore the measurement matrix will be an identity matrix of size 5 × 5. The
measurement matrix is the same as for the continuous state space system
Hnf = I (3.2.17)
3.2.3 The Kalman Filters for the Fault Scenarios
There are important adjustments that must be made for each fault scenario Kalman filter.
Note that after a fault has occurred, the control signal is independent of the true control sur-
face deflection, however, the control surface still has an effect on the dynamics of the system.
The actuator deflection therefore becomes one of the system states and must be estimated.
With this adjustment the required actuator information for the control re-allocation is also
readily available when needed.
The new augmented state vector includes the estimated actuator deflection
xi =
[
x
δˆi
]
(3.2.18)
where i represents the ith Kalman filter for the ith fault scenario.
The dynamics of the ith actuator are described by its corresponding column in the no-fault
input matrix, Gnf . To augment the fault state space matrices, the ith column is nulled in
the input matrix and added to the state matrix. It is also assumed that the states of the
system have little to no effect on the deflection of the actuator once a fault has occurred.
The last row in the state matrix is therefore nulled except for the element corresponding to
the actuator deflection itself. This will be set as unity, since the deflection is assumed to
have no increasing or decreasing effect on the future state of the deflection.
Fi =
[
Fnf G(i)nf
0 1
]
(3.2.19)
Gi =
[
G(0,i)nf
0
]
(3.2.20)
where G(i)nf represents the ith column of Gnf and G
(0,i)
nf corresponds to replacing the ith
column of Gnf with zeros.
There are no sensors that directly measure the deflection of the control surfaces, which is
one of the objectives of this research. The additional column corresponding to the actuator
deflection is therefore nulled and the measurement matrix becomes
Hi =
[
Hnf 0
]
(3.2.21)
=
[
I 0
]
(3.2.22)
The state equations for the ith fault scenario Kalman filters becomes
xi(k + 1) = Fixi(k) + Giu(k) + wi(k) (3.2.23)
yi(k) = Hixi(k) + vi(k) (3.2.24)
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where the covariance matrices
Qi(k) = E{wi(k)wTi (k)} (3.2.25)
Ri(k) = E{vi(k)vTi (k)} (3.2.26)
The covariance matrices for the process and measurement noise in the case of the fault
scenarios must take the effect of the actuator fault into account. The derivation of these
covariance matrices are shown in appendix C.
The same Kalman filter process is followed as in section 3.2.1 to estimate the states of
the fault scenarios. It is interesting to note that while the process is running on-board
the aircraft, the fault scenario filters still estimate the actuator deflections so that they
correspond with what is observed through the measurements. This fact translates into two
different observations.
The first is that when a fault occurs with enough actuator excitation, the residuals of the
incorrect Kalman filters will be larger than the correct one. However, when there is no
actuator excitation, the filters should have small, similar residuals that makes discerning
between different fault scenarios more difficult.
The second is that when a fault occurs, all the fault filters will still estimate their particular
actuator deflection so that the state estimate resembles what is observed through the sensors.
This creates interesting responses from filters whose fault is not actually active. This does
not affect the performance of the FDI in providing accurate information to the re-allocation
process as only the information of the real faulty sensor is sent to it. This phenomenon is
clearly shown and discussed in the results later in the chapter.
3.2.4 Replacing the Linear Kalman Filters with Extended Kalman
Filters
The aircraft is a naturally non-linear system as can be seen in equations 2.10.1 to 2.10.12.
The inability of the linear Kalman filters to deal with the non-linearities can be bypassed by
using extended Kalman filters (EKF) instead. A separate module with a bank of extended
Kalman filters will be developed, which will run parallel to the bank of linear Kalman filters.
This allows us to compare the advantages and disadvantages that an extended Kalman filter
has over the use of linear Kalman filters.
One of the differences between the extended Kalman filter and the linear Kalman filter is
that the system matrices, covariances and Kalman gains change with time. These changes
are the result of the linearising process that occurs at every time step. The prediction step
is also substituted with the non-linear solution of equation 2.11.11 with the previous state
estimate as the initial condition
xˆk|k−1 = xˆk−1|k−1 + T f(xˆk−1|k−1,uk−1) (3.2.27)
where T is the time step length.
At each time step the dynamic pressure, the airflow velocity as well as the angular rates are
re-evaluated and used in the linearising process to alter the state and input matrices. Ak
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and Bk are then used in the EKF to recalculate the covariance matrices and the Kalman
gains.
The same decision process will be used on both the bank of extended and linear Kalman
filter residuals and residual covariance matrices.
3.3 Decision Process
The decision process is concerned with making an informed automated decision over whether
or not a fault has occurred. This is not truely the probability that a fault has occurred but
rather a likelihood in the form of a probability. The first step in the decision process is to
find a quantitative way to categorise the fault state in which the system is operating. This
will be done by determining the probability that the system is in a specific fault state. The
second part is to employ this information to make a final fault decision.
3.3.1 Gaussian Bayes Classifier
To calculate the probability of the faults, a Gaussian Bayes Classifier (GBC) will be used.
The use of a GBC is ideal because the bank of Kalman filters provides all the statistical
information (the residuals r˜k and the residual covariance matrix Sk) required to construct
a likelihood function for all the parameters in all the fault scenarios. The GBC then uses
the likelihood functions to create probabilities of the fault scenarios.
The aim of the GBC is to determine a likelihood of a specific class variable, C, given a number
of feature variables or evidence F = [F1, F2, ..., Fn]. In this research the class variable will
be the type of fault, denoted by θ, and the evidence will be the sequence of last observed
sensor values Y(k) = [y(k),y(k − 1),y(k − 2), ...,y(0)]T .
p(C|F) = p(θ|Y(k)) (3.3.1)
According to Bayes’ theorem,
p(θ|Y(k)) = p(θ)p(Y(k)|θ)
p(Y(k)) (3.3.2)
We denote the ith fault as θi and the probability of the ith fault being active as pi(k) at
time step k. More formally stated
pi(k) = p(θ = θi|Y(k)) (3.3.3)
= p(Y(k)|θ = θi)p(θ = θi)
p(Y(k)) (3.3.4)
A reasonable assumption is that the fault scenarios can happen independently from one
another. The probability p(Y(k)), found in the denominator of equation 3.3.4, can therefore
be expanded with the use of the chain rule as
p(Y(k)) = p(Y(k)|θ = θ1)p(θ = θ1) + · · ·+ p(Y(k)|θ = θN )p(θ = θN ) (3.3.5)
=
N∑
j=1
p(Y(k)|θ = θj)p(θ = θj) (3.3.6)
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where N is the number of fault scenarios, including the no-fault case. Equation 3.3.4 then
becomes
pi(k) =
p(Y(k)|θ = θi)p(θ = θi)∑N
j=1 p(Y(k)|θ = θj)p(θ = θj)
(3.3.7)
In its current form, all the covariances and values for the last sequence of measurements
must be known to determine the probability. To transform equation 3.3.7 into a recursive
formula and save on computational power, the sequence of measurements is re-written as
[y(k),Y(k − 1)]T . With the use of the chain rule again, the probability of Y(k) given a
specific fault scenario becomes
p(Y(k)|θ = θi) = p([y(k),Y(k − 1)]T |θ = θi) (3.3.8)
= p(y(k)|Y(k − 1), θ = θi)p(Y(k − 1)|θ = θi) (3.3.9)
= p(y(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1))p(θ = θi|Y(k − 1)) (3.3.10)
= p(y(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1))pi(k − 1) (3.3.11)
Substituting equation 3.3.11 into equation 3.3.7 gives [2]
pi(k) =
p(y(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1))pi(k − 1)p(θ = θi)∑N
j=1 p(y(k)|θ = θj ,Y(k − 1))pj(k − 1)p(θ = θj)
(3.3.12)
= p(yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1))pi(k − 1)∑N
j=1 p(yj(k)|θ = θj ,Y(k − 1))pj(k − 1)
(3.3.13)
The probability that any of the fault scenarios are active, without any other prior knowledge,
is assumed to be equal. Therefore p(θ = θi) = 1N for i = 1, 2, · · · , N and the terms p(θ = θi)
and p(θ = θj) cancel each other out in equation 3.3.12. Note that the denominator of
equation 3.3.13 is the sum of the numerators of all the fault probability computations, so
that all the fault probabilities add up to one. Also note that the probability is determined as
the product of a current probability and the previous probability. It is therefore important
to prevent the probability from reaching zero and so becoming locked at zero.
The problem in equation 3.3.13 is finding an explicit formula for p(y(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)).
In the flight simulation and flight tests a set of observed sensor values y(k) are given. The
likelihood that a specific fault has occurred, given the set of observations in the flight test,
must be determined. Probability and likelihood are however mathematically similar and
formally stated, “[t]he likelihood of a specific hypothesis (or class variable), given a set of
observed features, is proportional the probability of the data outcomes given the specific
hypothesis being true” [34]
L(C|F ) ∝ p(F |C) (3.3.14)
where C is the class variable and F is the observed features. The conditional probability in
equation 3.3.11 can therefore be written as a likelihood
p(yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)) = C1L(θ = θi,Y(k − 1)|yi(k)) (3.3.15)
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where C1 is a constant of proportionality. Equation 3.3.13 can therefore be rewritten as a
likelihood ratio test, which translates into a probability
pi(k) =
C1L(θ = θi,Y(k − 1)|y(k))pi(k − 1)∑N
j=1 C1L(θ = θi,Y(k − 1)|y(k))pj(k − 1)
(3.3.16)
The sensor outputs have continuous values (note, not time continuous but value continuous)
and the normal distribution function described by the residual covariance matrix returns
a probability density. According to [34], the likelihood function of a hypothesis, given a
continuous parameter, is proportional to the probability density function of the parameter,
given a specific hypothesis
L(θ = θi,Y(k − 1)|yi(k)) = C2f(yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)) (3.3.17)
The actual value of a likelihood function bears no meaning, but is used to compare it to
the likelihood of belonging to a specific density distribution. It is now necessary to derive
the probability density f(y(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)) and it is chosen to be a normal distributed
density function as all the required information is available from the Kalman filters
f(y(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)) =
1
(2pi)m2 |Σ| 12 exp
(
−12(y(k)− µ(k))
TΣ−1(y(k)− µ(k))
)
(3.3.18)
where Σ is the covariance matrix and µ(k) is the mean value of the measurement at time
step k. m is the dimension of the measurement (in this case m=5). If the mean value in
equation 3.3.18 is substituted with the expected value of the measurement, yˆ(k) = Hxˆ(k),
the term (y(k)− µ(k)) conveniently becomes the Kalman filter residual
(y(k)− µ(k)) = (y(k)−Hxˆ(k)) (3.3.19)
= r˜(k) (3.3.20)
and the covariance chosen as the residual covariance matrix Σ = Sk. Equation 3.3.18 can
now be written in compact form as
f(y = yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)) = λi(k)e−
r˜i(k)T Sk r˜i(k)
2 (3.3.21)
where
λi(k) =
1
(2pi)m2 |Sk| 12
(3.3.22)
Equation 3.3.13 is finally written as
pi(k) =
C1C2f(y = yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1))pi(k − 1)∑N
j=1
C1C2f(y = yj(k)|θ = θj ,Y(k − 1))pj(k − 1)
(3.3.23)
pi(k) =
f(y = yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1))pi(k − 1)∑N
j=1 f(y = yj(k)|θ = θj ,Y(k − 1))pj(k − 1)
(3.3.24)
where f(y = yi(k)|θ = θi,Y(k − 1)) is given by equation 3.3.21.
A simplified representation of equation 3.3.24 is given in figure 3.2. In the figure three
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Figure 3.2: Conditional probability density for a one-dimensional feature case with three possible
fault scenarios.
probability density functions (PDF) are given, assuming a one-dimensional residual, as if
there are only three possible fault hypothesis and one sensor on board the aircraft. These
density functions also define the likelihood functions of the three residuals as explained in
equation 3.3.17. The predicted values for the sensors, Hxˆi(k), are taken as the mean value
for the respective PDFs. The residual r˜i(k) is taken as the difference between the predicted
and observed value for the sensor. In the figure, r˜2(k) is shown as an example. The values
of the PDFs at the particular value for their residuals (the black vertical line) is then taken
as a scaled value for the likelihood Li.
An interesting conclusion can be made from figure 3.2. When there is little to no actuator
excitation, the residuals will be similar and close to zero. The covariance for the no-fault
case is the smallest (see appendix C) and subsequently the PDF relating to the no-fault
case will then have the highest peak. The likelihood for the no-fault case will always be
the highest even if an actuator is at fault. This shows that the system has difficulty finding
faults with small actuator excitation.
3.3.2 State Estimate
The estimated state is determined by a weighted sum of all the different Kalman filters’
estimated states. The ith fault scenario will be designated by the subscript i including the
no-fault scenario. With this information the state estimate is determined with
xˆ(k) =
∑
i
xˆi(k)pi(k) (3.3.25)
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where xˆi(k) is the state estimate of the ith filter and pi(k) is the probability that the ith
scenario is active.
3.3.3 Final Decision Process
The information gained from the Bayes classifier must be used to make a final formal de-
cision. This decision will activate the control re-allocation process and inform any users or
flight log of the fault. If the Bayes classifier could determine the probability of the fault
exactly it would be intuitive to use the probability directly as the fault decision. The clas-
sifier is however built upon simplifying assumptions. The same is true for the mathematics
describing the matrices used in the Kalman filter, as well as in determining the process and
measurement noise covariance matrices.
A conservative decision is then necessary to improve the decision quality. The quality is
quantified by its false alarm rate and missed detection rate [8]. A threshold method will
be incorporated to define the decision process because of its simplicity and stability. The
quality of the decision process will then be tested with the simulation as well as in flight
tests. Two thresholds will be used to quantify that a fault has occurred:
1. If the probability of a scenario reaches above 90% it becomes eligible to be classified
as active.
2. If a scenario is eligible for longer than two seconds it is classified as active.
A scenario is declared inactive when the probability reaches below 10% for two seconds.
When no scenario is declared active according to the decision process thus far, the no-fault
scenario is assumed active.
3.4 Simulations for the Bank of Kalman Filters FDI Method
The simulation was run in MATLAB® R2008b with the implementation of Simulink. The
architecture of the Simulink model is shown in figure 3.3. The non-linear aircraft model
uses an embedded code written in C to simulate the aerodynamic, gravitational and thrust
forces and moments to determine the position, velocities, attitude and angular rates of the
aircraft during simulation.
The simulation also incorporates a simple linear control system to keep the aircraft within its
flight envelope and induce desired manoeuvres when necessary. The design and development
of the control system falls outside the scope of this research.
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Figure 3.3: The Simulink model used to simulate the performance of a bank of Kalman filters for
FDI.
The simulation was used to display the performance of the FDI in different typical flight
missions. The simulations were run on both the linear Kalman filters and the extended
Kalman filters. The typical flight missions are:
1. Straight and level flight with minimal process noise
2. Straight and level flight with substantial process noise (such as wind)
3. A circular path that closely resembles a typical flight test trajectory
4. A zero-mean randomly generated flight mission that induces actuator excitation
• “Zero-mean” in the sense that over time the aircraft still flies reasonably close
around its flight trim conditions.
These missions were chosen to illustrate the performance of the FDI at different levels of
actuator excitation as well as in different styles of flight. Low actuator excitation is expected
to result in poor FDI performance, such as in case 1.
The control re-allocation system that was developed at the ESL requires the detection and
isolation of locked-in-place faults. The re-allocation system was tested at intervals of 2.5◦
to solve the control re-allocation problem for faulty actuators, from a maximum absolute
value fault of 15◦ to a minimum of 0◦ locked-in-place [3]. From section 3.3.1 it was seen
that a higher actuator deflection (actuator excitation) causes the FDI to perform better.
Therefore only the two smallest locked-in-place faults will be simulated:
1. Each actuator at 0◦ locked-in-place at different times
2. Each actuator at 2.5◦ locked-in-place at different times
For all the above-mentioned flight missions a 0◦ locked-in-place will be simulated. The 2.5◦
locked-in-place fault will only be simulated on the mission that is expected to have the least
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. FIRST FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION METHOD: A BANK OF
KALMAN FILTERS 44
amount of natural actuator excitation, as this will probably be the mission with the worst
FDI performance. 2.5◦ locked-in-place faults will only be simulated on the straight and level
flight, with minimal process noise, mission.
The measurement and process noise was also simulated in accordance with the covariance
matrices determined in appendix C. Note that in the linear Kalman filter the residual and
state covariance matrices, as well as the Kalman gains have constant values and can be
determined beforehand [35].
The simulation was run for 400 seconds. The system scenario is changed each 30 seconds
from a no-fault state to a fault state, then back to a no-fault state. Table 3.1 summarises
the sequence of simulated events.
Fault Scenario Active time in seconds
No-fault 0-30
Right aileron fault 30-60
No-fault 60-90
Left aileron fault 90-120
No-fault 120-150
Right elevator fault 150-180
No-fault 180-210
Left elevator fault 210-240
No-fault 240-270
Right rudder fault 270-300
No-fault 300-330
Left rudder fault 330-360
No-fault 360-400
Table 3.1: Sequence of fault scenarios in the simulation.
In the simulations two important outputs from the FDI system are recorded. The first is the
fault decision based on the probability of the faults. The second is the estimated deflections
of the actuators.
Each mission’s simulation results show seven graphs, each one depicting the probability and
decision information for each fault hypothesis. The top graph is the no-fault scenario, the
second one the right-aileron fault scenario and so forth until the left rudder fault scenario.
In each graph the probability from both the linear and extended Kalman filter is given, as
well as the fault decision based on these probabilities.
The decision value is set as unity when the decision is positive for the specific scenario and
zero if it is negative. The graphs also show the correct fault decision in dashed lines. The
closer the decision output is to the correct fault decision, the better the FDI performance.
The FDI system can accurately estimate the deflection of the actuators. The results of the
actuator deflection estimation will only be shown for the last mission (2.5◦ locked-in-place)
as it shows the dynamics and performance of the actuator deflection estimation the best.
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3.4.1 Simulation Results for a Straight and Level Flight with Minimal
Process Noise
In figure 3.4 it is evident that low process noise, as well as low actuator excitation, gives poor
FDI performance. This is exactly what would be expected from the current system. The
driving force for isolating the fault is directly coupled with the amplitude of the residuals.
The residuals are in turn linked to the amplitude of the actuator excitations. The results
are the same for the bank of linear Kalman filters and the bank of extended Kalman filters.
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Figure 3.4: Probabilities for a straight and level flight with minimal process noise.
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3.4.2 Simulation Results for a Straight and Level Flight with
Substantial Process Noise
With substantial process noise in the form of wind there is much better performance than
without the wind, as is evident from figure 3.5. The windy simulation induces actuator
excitation, which improves the performance of the FDI system. It must be noted however
that there is still a considerable amount of time that passes before the fault is isolated. This
is due to the fact that the prediction steps in the Kalman filter do not predict the effect of
wind. The conclusion is therefore that the FDI performance is more sensitive to actuator
excitation than it is to external disturbances.
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Figure 3.5: Probabilities for a straight and level flight with substantial process noise.
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3.4.3 Simulation Results for a Circular Flight Path that Closely
Resembles the Flight Test Trajectory
This simulation represents the most realistic of the five simulations. From figure 3.6 it can
be seen that the bank of linear Kalman filters perform poorly against the bank of extended
Kalman filters. This can be due to the fact that with aircraft manoeuvres the operating point
of the aircraft drifts away from the trim conditions. The linear Kalman filters are designed
to operate at these trim conditions, whereas the extended Kalman filters can operate in a
much larger flight envelope. This is why the bank of extended Kalman filters demonstrate
superior performance.
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Figure 3.6: Probabilities for a circular flight path that closely resembles the flight test trajectory.
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3.4.4 Simulation Results for a Randomly Generated Flight Mission
that Induces Actuator Excitation
With the random flight mission the aircraft still stays within the flight envelope, but there
is more actuator excitation. This clearly induces much better FDI performance, as can be
seen in figure 3.7.
It is important to note that the bank of linear Kalman filters is about one or two seconds
faster with some of the fault isolations. This can be attributed to the fact that a linear
Kalman filter’s Kalman gain and residual covariance matrix remain constant. The extended
Kalman filter on the other hand determines the Kalman gain as well as all of its covariance
matrices recursively. There will therefore always be some induced error in the extended
Kalman filters due to the transients of the recursive processes inside the filter.
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Figure 3.7: Probabilities for a randomly generated flight mission.
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3.4.5 Simulation Results for a Straight and Level Flight with Minimal
Process Noise, but the Actuators Fail with a Non-Zero
Locked-in-Place Fault
The locked-in-place faults create large residuals which in turn allow for exceptional FDI
performance as observed in figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Probabilities for a randomly generated flight mission where the actuators fail with a
locked-in-place fault of 2.5◦.
The actuator deflection estimation is shown in figure 3.9. Only the non-greyed out areas on
the graphs are sent to the re-allocation process. It is interesting to note that both the linear
and extended Kalman filters estimate the actuator quite accurately.
There is however a very important phenomenon that illustrates the way that the Kalman
filters estimate the deflections. Each Kalman filter is set up in such a way that the filter
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itself always believes that its own fault scenario is active. For example, the Kalman filter for
the left elevator fault is always trying to estimate the true value for only the left elevator.
The Kalman gain will always try to steer the estimated variables to values that lie between
the measured values and the predicted values. The Kalman filters then try to push the
estimated actuator deflection in such a way as to obtain a final state-only estimate that
resembles the measured state more closely.
An interesting fact is that the Kalman filters will estimate the actuator deflection even
when that particular actuator is not faulty. This is why in figure 3.9 the estimated actuator
deflections are erroneous when another fault is occurring (in the greyed out areas). This
should not cause any concern, as the information about the estimated actuator deflection
is only sent to the control re-allocation process once it is decided that it is indeed that
particular actuator that is at fault (non-greyed out areas). This phenomenon also illustrates
how easily actuators can have the same effect as other actuators.
For example, the right elevator could induce the same dynamic effect as the faulty right
aileron, as seen in figure 3.9 from 30 to 60 seconds. The right elevator is not that effective
at mimicking the effect of a left aileron fault, seen as the lower estimated amplitude at 90
to 120 seconds. It must be noted that no single actuator will be able to mimic exactly the
effect of another actuator, as is evident from the input matrix as well as the aerodynamic
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Figure 3.9: Estimated actuator deflections for a random generated flight mission where the actu-
ators fail with a non-zero locked-in-place fault.
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control derivatives in appendix A.
3.5 Fault Detection and Isolation Performance
In section 3.4 the performance of the FDI in some typical flight missions were shown. In
this section a more comprehensive simulation was run to show the FDI performance over a
large range of situations. The simulations were run on only the bank of extended Kalman
filters.
According to [8] the quality of an FDI method can be based on the false alarm rate and
missed detection rate. The detection performance is further classified by the fault sensitivity,
detection time (reaction speed) and robustness. Three separate arrangements were set up
on the system of figure 3.3. Several simulations were run on each arrangement to determine
the FDI performance. The three arrangements were:
1. The aerodynamic stability and control derivatives were changed to test for robustness.
A constant amount of natural actuator excitation and process noise was present.
2. The process noise was increased from zero to a substantial amount of wind to test for
robustness.
3. The actuator excitation was increased from zero to 3◦ amplitude on all actuators to
test for fault sensitivity.
All three arrangements also tested for detection time.
For each arrangement, a value was set for its specific simulation parameter (such as the
amount of process noise) and ten, 400-second simulations with the same failing sequence as
in table 3.1 were run. To test for the false alarm rate, the same simulations were run, but
no fault occurred. The number of false alarms were then counted.
The simulation was run ten times with different random values for the process and measure-
ment noise to give a more accurate statistical result. The maximum, minimum and average
missed detection and false alarm rates were recorded for the ten simulations. The average
values for the detection times and false alarm rates for the separate actuators were also
recorded. This process was repeated for all the different simulation parameter values of an
arrangement.
The length of a fault was set as 30 seconds. Therefore a detection time larger than 30
seconds indicates a missed fault detection.
Note that these simulations used a bank of extended Kalman filters designed for a specific
amount of process noise (see appendix C). In figure 3.12 (section 3.5.3) the effects of using
different design values for the process noise covariance matrix will be discussed.
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3.5.1 The Effect of Parameter Changes on FDI Performance
The aerodynamic stability and control derivatives were changed from 90% of their original
values to 110%. For this arrangement some natural actuator excitation was present, as well
as a nominal amount of process noise. The FDI performance is expected to be the greatest
at around 100% of the original values, as the Kalman filters were designed with these values.
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Figure 3.10: The effect of parameter changes on the bank of extended Kalman filters FDI per-
formance.
From figure 3.10 it is seen that the lowest missed detection rate and lowest false alarm rate
is around the 100% original aerodynamic values, indicating the best FDI performance at
this point. As the aerodynamic values diverge from their original values, the performance of
the FDI also degrades. There is a narrow 3% margin to either side of the 100% parameter
values where the FDI has less than one false alarm per minute, but beyond 3% parameter
change the FDI becomes less effective.
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3.5.2 The Effect of Process Noise on FDI Performance
The effect of process noise is twofold. The first effect is that it induces actuator excitation to
reject the disturbances, which increases the FDI performance as the process noise increases.
However, the uncertainty in process noise creates some confusion in the FDI system and
large amounts of process noise therefore degrades the FDI performance.
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Figure 3.11: The effect of process noise on the bank of extended Kalman filters’ FDI performance.
In figure 3.11 it is evident that an increase in process noise improves the detection time as
the actuator excitation increases. The false alarms, however, increase as the process noise
increases, degrading the FDI performance as expected.
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3.5.3 The Effect of Actuator Excitation on FDI Performance
Actuator excitation should have a positive effect on FDI performance, as discussed in section
3.3.1. Note that in figure 3.12 the effect of different process noise covariance matrices on the
design of the bank of Kalman filters is shown. The broken lines represent average detection
times for the bank of Kalman filters using different process noise covariance matrices. The
solid lines represent the detection times for only the simulations using an expected wind
velocity of 2 m/s.
The effect of using larger values for the design wind velocity is that the fault sensitivity
decreases.
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Figure 3.12: The effect of actuator excitation on the bank of extended Kalman filters’ FDI
performance.
The average fault sensitivity indicates the average size of faults. Smaller faults are not
detected and in figure 3.12 this is indicated by the plateau at a detection time of 30 seconds.
Note that the length of the fault is chosen randomly at 30 seconds. However, the actual
average fault sensitivity should be similar.
In figure 3.12 it can be seen that the performance of the FDI increases significantly with
actuator excitation. The FDI performance stabilises at 1◦ actuator amplitude at about 4
seconds detection time.
As the actuator excitation becomes large, the aircraft tends to fly well outside the trim condi-
tions where non-linearities become significant. The extended Kalman filters are designed to
work under these non-linear conditions. This is seen in figure 3.12 as the 4 seconds detection
time plateau and does not increase significantly at higher actuator excitation values.
From figure 3.12 it is seen that the aileron fault detection time decrease at lower actuator
excitation than the rudders. This implies that aileron faults are more easily detected than
rudder faults. The effectiveness of the FDI to detect elevator faults lie between the ailerons
and rudders.
The false alarm rates for the bank of Kalman filters are not shown, as no false alarms were
detected by increasing actuator excitation on the simulations alone, as was expected. Recall
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that the extended Kalman filters are designed to work even at large actuator excitation
amplitudes.
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Chapter 4
Second Fault Detection and Isolation
Method: The Parity Space Approach
As described in figure 1.3, a fault detection and isolation system creates residuals from the
aircraft observables, that is, on the command inputs and measured outputs. The parity
space approach is a method of pairing all the analytical redundancies between these inputs
and outputs of a system. The benefit of the parity space approach is that it provides a
quantitative measure of the achievable level of robustness in the residuals in the early stages
of a design [23].
4.1 Parity Relations (Analytical Redundancy)
The concept of residual generation stems from analytical redundancy among dissimilar in-
struments, in which knowledge of the functional relationships among the variables being
measured is used [36]. Analytical redundancy can take on two forms:
• Direct redundancy - the functional relationship between components at a specific time
step
• Temporal redundancy - the functional relationship between components over a specific
time range
The residuals that are created out of these redundancies are the divergence between the
expected behaviour and the observed sensor outputs. For an understanding of the analytical
redundancy in a system, consider the discrete state space system:
x(k + 1) = Fx(k) + Gu(k) (4.1.1)
y(k) = Hx(k) (4.1.2)
where x(k) is the N-dimensional state vector, F is the N×N state matrix, G is the N×M
input matrix, and H is a L × N constant measurement matrix. It is clear that N is the
number of states, M is the number of input actuators and L is the number of sensors. The
56
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vector u(k) represents the known input to the actuators and the vector y(k) represents the
measurements from the sensors.
Direct redundancy relations exist where a variable measured by a sensor can be obtained
through the algebraic relationships of the instantaneous outputs of the other sensors. This
implies that there are some rows in H that are linearly dependent and therefore their output
can be compiled as a linear combination of some of the other sensors. Consider for example
y1(k) =
L∑
i=2
αiyi(k) (4.1.3)
where yi(k) is the ith element in the measurement vector.
In the absence of faults in the sensor or sensor noise, the residual
y1(k)−
L∑
i=2
αiyi(k) (4.1.4)
should be zero. If a large enough residual exists, it would indicate a sensor fault. While
sensor faults can be detected, there is a flaw in direct redundancy in that it cannot indicate
an actuator fault. Temporal redundancy on the other hand relates sensor outputs and
actuator inputs and the potential exists that it can be used to create residuals that can
detect actuator faults. This is due to the fact that an actuator’s effect is only seen in the
next time step (see equation 4.1.1). Temporal redundancy can also facilitate relationships
between sensors where no direct redundancy exists.
This extra information in the form of temporal redundancy relations between dissimilar
actuators and sensors may detect a greater number of failures, however it does increase the
required computational power. The major problem with these relations is the uncertainty in
aircraft parameters, process noise and sensor noise. These uncertainties affect the residual
signals and can lead to false alarms and missed fault detections. The robustness of the
residual generation is therefore of importance.
The parity relations help the design process in this regard. First the redundancies of the
components under consideration are determined in the form of parity relations. The resi-
duals, that are the least sensitive to parameter changes and disturbances, are then built up
from these relations by means of an optimisation process. The parity relations also enable
us to quantify to an extent the effect of uncertainties on residuals.
4.2 The Generalised Parity Space
Let us define from the discrete state space system in equations 4.1.1 and 4.1.2
O(l) =

H
HF
...
HFl
 (4.2.1)
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for the combination of sensors on board the aircraft. The Cayley-Hamilton theorem implies
that there exists an n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , so that the rank of O(l) can be stated as [23]
rank O(l) =
l + 1 l < nn l ≥ n (4.2.2)
The null space of the matrix O(n− 1) is known as the unobservable subspace of the set of
sensors. The rows of O(n − 1) span the observable subspace of the set of sensors and the
rows have the dimension N . Note that in the above equation O(l) has (n+1)×L rows while
it is only of rank n. The reason for this will become apparent when the parity relations are
built up.
To comprehend the generalised parity space, start with defining the set of sensor outputs in
terms of the current state and the input signal. From equation 4.1.2
y(k) = Hx(k) (4.2.3)
If temporal redundancy is desired, it is not only the current state that is taken into account,
but signals from several time steps (the number of time steps will be determined by the
order of the system and the rank of the observability matrix). Taking the next time step
signal and substituting equation 4.1.1 into equation 4.2.3 and continuing this process
y(k + 1) = Hx(k + 1) (4.2.4)
= H[Fx(k) + Gu(k)] (4.2.5)
= HFx(k) + HGu(k) (4.2.6)
y(k + 2) = Hx(k + 2) (4.2.7)
= HFx(k + 1) + HGu(k + 1) (4.2.8)
= HF2x(k) + HFGu(k) + HGu(k + 1) (4.2.9)
...
y(k + n) = Hx(k + n) (4.2.10)
= HFnx(k) + HFn−1Gu(k) + . . .+ HGu(k + n− 1) (4.2.11)
time shifted to the most recent sensor output
y(k) = Hx(k) (4.2.12)
= HFnx(k − n) + HFn−1Gu(k − n) + . . .+ HGu(k − 1) (4.2.13)
The generalisation of equations 4.2.3 to 4.2.11 can be written as
Y(k) = Ox(k − n) + JU(k, n) (4.2.14)
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where
J =

0 0
HG 0
HFG HG
HF2G HFG
...
HFn−1G HFn−2G . . . HG 0

(4.2.15)
U(k, n) =

u(k − n)
...
u(k)
 (4.2.16)
Because the goal of the parity space in fault detection and isolation is the generation of
residuals, equation 4.2.14 is rewritten as
0 = Y(k)−Ox(k − n)− JU(k, n) (4.2.17)
It is clear from the equation above, that if there were no model uncertainties or noise, the
equation would hold if there are no faults occurring. Therefore the above equation relates
the output signal, the states and the input signal to one another in the case of a fault-
free scenario. It would be best to relate the input signals to the output signals without
dependence on the states, thereby eliminating the necessity for a state observer. This can
be done by defining the parity vector as
P(k) = Ω [Y(k)−Ox(k − n)− JU(k, n)] (4.2.18)
If the left null space Ω can be found so that ΩO = 0 for any x(k) then the parity vector
gains independence in terms of the system states. To find the left null space, a singular
value decomposition is done on O so that
O = USVT (4.2.19)
where U and V are orthonormal matrices and S is a rectangular diagonal scaling matrix.
The diagonal elements in S are denoted s1, s2, . . . , smax{m,n} and are called the singular
values of O. The columns vi of V that correspond to si = 0 form an orthonormal basis of
the null space of O [37].
When the null space Ω is found, equation 4.2.17 is changed into
P(k) = ΩY(k)−:
0
ΩOx(k)−ΩJU(k, n0) (4.2.20)
P(k) = Ω [Y(k)− JU(k, n)] (4.2.21)
Now note that equation 4.2.21 is independent of the state x(k). In the absence of failures,
noise and uncertainty, P(k) = 0. In the presence of zero-mean noise and no failures, P(k)
will be a zero-mean random vector [23]. When a non-zero mean fault occurs, the parity
vector will become biased and each different failure will create a different bias in the parity
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vector. When a zero-mean fault occurs, the parity vector will remain zero-mean but will
have a higher variance.
The generalised parity space is the n ×N dimensional space containing all the parity vec-
tors. The size and direction of the parity vector in the parity space is then used to detect
and identify the active fault scenario. Under the no-fail case (P(k) = 0) equation 4.2.21
characterises all the analytical redundancies for the system, because it specifies all the pos-
sible independent relationships between the actuator inputs and sensor outputs. Any linear
combination of the rows in equation 4.2.21 is called a parity equation or parity relation.
Faults, process noise and measurement noise affect the parity relations. Rewriting equation
4.1.1 and 4.1.2 and taking these effects into account
x(k + 1) = Fx(k) + Gu(k) + Sf f(k) + Swnw(k) (4.2.22)
y(k) = Hx(k) + Svnv(k) (4.2.23)
where f(k) are the faults, nw(k) is a zero-mean white noise disturbance vector and nv(k) is
the zero-mean white noise measurement vector. The disturbance vectors nw(k) and nv(k)
are set to have identity covariance matrices. Note that the statistical information about
how the process noise and measurement noise affect the system will be quantified by Sw
and Sv. Sf is the transformation matrix describing how the faults enter the system. Using
these definitions equation 4.2.14 can be rewritten as
Y(k) = Ox(k) + JU(k, n) + LfP(k, n) + LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n) (4.2.24)
where
P(k, n) =

f(k − n)
...
f(k)
 (4.2.25)
Nw(k, n) =

nw(k − n)
...
nw(k)
 (4.2.26)
Nv(k, n) =

nv(k − n)
...
nv(k)
 (4.2.27)
and the matrices
Lf =

0 0
HSf 0
HFSf HSf
HF2Sf HFSf
...
HFn−1Sf HFn−2Sf . . . HSf 0

(4.2.28)
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Lw =

0 0 0
HSw 0 0
HFSw HSw 0
HF2Sw HFSw HSw
...
HFn−1Sw HFn−2Sw HFn−3Sw . . . HSw 0

(4.2.29)
Lv =

Sv 0 0
0 Sv 0
0 0 Sv
...
0 0 0 . . . 0 Sv

(4.2.30)
Note that P(k) is the parity relations vector and P(k, n) is the sequence of last n+ 1 faults.
Equation 4.2.24 can be rewritten
0 = Y(k)−Ox(k)− JU(k, n)− LfP(k, n)− LwNw(k, n)− LvNv(k, n) (4.2.31)
0 = Ω[Y(k)−Ox(k)− JU(k, n)− LfP(k, n)− LwNw(k, n)− LvNv(k, n)] (4.2.32)
Ω[Y(k)− JU(k, n)] = Ω[LfP(k, n) + LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n)] (4.2.33)
P(k) = Ω[Y(k)− JU(k, n)] (4.2.34)
= Ω[LfP(k, n) + LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n)] (4.2.35)
where equation 4.2.34 describes the residual generator that uses known outputs and inputs
to form residuals, and equation 4.2.35 constitutes the unknown disturbances and faults that
must be found. The residuals formed by equation 4.2.34 will be called the primary residuals,
as they are not yet optimised for fault detection and isolation. A linear transformation
of these residuals that optimise the parity relations must be found so that the faults are
sufficiently discernable.
4.3 Optimising the Residuals for Fault Detection and Isolation
A linear transformation of equation 4.2.34 can be optimised for FDI. This is done by mul-
tiplying equation 4.2.34 with a transformation matrix T that will be determined in this
section:
R(k) = TP(k) (4.3.1)
= TΩ [Y(k)− JU(k, n)] (4.3.2)
= TΩ [LfP(k, n) + LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n)] (4.3.3)
Recall that any linear combination of the rows in Ω still form a null vector when multiplied by
O [37]. The optimisation problem is therefore to find an optimal linear sum of the rows in Ω
to form a new optimised row. The optimisation will be conducted several times, each time to
optimise the sensitivity to a different fault scenario and thereby increasing the discernability
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between residuals. The element values in each row of T resemble the weightings given for
each row in Ω. The different rows T1,T2, . . . ,Ti in T therefore resemble the different
optimisation solutions for each fault scenario.
4.3.1 The Order of the Parity Space
Looking at the discrete state space system developed in chapter 2 there are five states in
x(k), eight controlled actuators in u(k) and five sensed values in y(k). The dimensions for
the state space is therefore
N = 5 (4.3.4)
M = 8 (4.3.5)
L = 5 (4.3.6)
For the parity space design the dynamics of the aircraft are linearised around the trim
conditions, as was done in chapter 3. In this research it was found that the order n of the
observability matrix was five. The order of the parity space is therefore five, which means
that the information contained in the residuals spans over six (n+1) time steps. This is
done so that a null space of O can always be found.
The number of actuator faults that will be detected was chosen in chapter 2 to be six. These
include detecting and isolating the right and left faults for the ailerons, elevators and rudders
of the aircraft.
4.3.2 The Process Noise Input Matrix
The disturbance vector nw(k) is assumed to be random white noise (as in chapter 3), but
where its covariance matrix will be set as an identity matrix. This is done so that construc-
ting the matrix Lw in equation 4.2.29 becomes possible. The matrices Sw then transform
nw(k) into the effect of process noise on the residuals. Sw must however be conditioned in
such a way as to assist with the optimisation process. To quantify the effect of process noise
on the sensors in the parity relations, the matrix Sw is chosen as the element-by-element
square root of the process noise covariance matrix (found in appendix C):
Sw =

3.39 2.84 0 0 0
2.84 4.34 0 0 0
0 0 3.89 2.37 3.35
0 0 2.37 3.09 1.78
0 0 3.35 1.78 4.78
× 10
−5 (4.3.7)
This gives an approximate standard deviation of the effect that the process noise has on the
system.
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4.3.3 The Measurement Noise Input Matrix
The measurement noise input matrix Sv will be taken as the element-by-element square root
of the measurement noise covariance matrix for the same reasons as for the process noise
input matrix:
Sv =

4.5 0 0 0 0
0 10 0 0 0
0 0 4.5 0 0
0 0 0 10 0
0 0 0 0 4.5
× 10
−3 (4.3.8)
4.3.4 The Faults Input Matrix
The faults will be described as the difference between the desired actuator deflection and
the real actuator deflection. The fault input matrix is then simply the same as the actuator
input matrix
Sf = G (4.3.9)
∴ Lf = J (4.3.10)
With this configuration the estimated actuator deflections can be found by a pseudoinverse
estimation technique as will be shown in section 4.5 later.
4.3.5 Multi-Objective Optimisation
The optimisation process will be repeated for each specific fault scenario. The optimisation
problem for the FDI has multiple objectives. These objectives relating to the residuals
created by equation 4.3.2 are:
1. Increase residual sensitivities if a specific fault occurs
2. Decrease sensitivity to other faults
3. Decrease sensitivity to disturbances
These objectives are combined to form a single aggregate cost function with the use of the
well-known weighted linear sum of the individual objectives. The optimisation problem
becomes finding a solution of
maximise
Ti
f(Ti) (4.3.11)
subject to gi(Ti) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m (4.3.12)
hi(Ti) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p (4.3.13)
where f(Ti) is the single aggregate cost function composed of
f(Ti) = c1J1(Ti)− c2J2(Ti)− c3J3(Ti) (4.3.14)
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and g and h are the inequality and equality constraints, respectively. c1, c2 and c3 is the
respective weighting given to each cost function and Ti is the ith row of the transformation
matrix, of which we are trying to optimise the element values.
Six optimisation processes will be conducted, one for each specific fault scenario. With this
configuration six residuals will be created with the largest residual resembling the active
fault scenario. The cost functions will be set up as follows: the first cost function quantifies
the effect of the fault θ = θi on the residuals
J1(Ti) =
(
TiΩL(i)f
)2
(4.3.15)
where L(i)f is a matrix made up of all the i+ 6l (l ∈ [0, 1, . . . , n− 1]) columns of Lf . When
a larger value for c1 is chosen, the effect will be that more weight is placed on the specific
fault, so that the fault is easier to detect in the specific residual.
The second cost function relates the effect of other faults (θ 6= θi) on the residuals and must
be minimised
J2(Ti) =
(
TiΩL(i=0)f
)2
(4.3.16)
where L(i=0)f is a matrix made up of nulling all the i+6l (l ∈ [0, 1, . . . , n−1]) columns in Lf .
Other faults can corrupt the residual and the value of c2 is increased so that the optimising
procedure penalises other faults. This includes penalising the left actuator if the specific
residual is designed for the right actuator and vice versa. There is a strong correlation
between the effect of a left and right actuator pair, so increasing c2 too much can have a
negative effect on the quality of the specific residual.
The third cost function quantifies to an uncertain extent the effect that disturbances have
on the residuals and should also be minimised:
J3(Ti) = (TiΩLn)2 + (TiΩLv)2 (4.3.17)
The consequence of increasing c3 is to minimise the effect of the disturbances of both the
measurement and process noise. All the parity relations are corrupted by disturbances,
so increasing c3 too much will give a solution that produce too small residuals that are
meaningless. Another effect of c3 is that more weight is placed on more recent values of the
inputs and outputs as the disturbances have a less cumulative effect on them.
The inequality constraints are that all the elements in Ti are inside the bound [-1,1] so that
the solution can become non-trivial
−1 ≤ ti,j ≤ 1 j = 1, 2, . . . , n×N (4.3.18)
The weightings were determined in an iterative manner. The first iteration was chosen as
c1 = 5 c2 = 1 c3 = 1 (4.3.19)
This was chosen because the effect of an actuator failure will be about five times smaller
than the sum of the other actuator failure effects. The weighting c3 is set as unity.
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4.3.6 Optimisation Technique
The optimisation procedures were implemented using a generalised reduced gradient non-
linear optimisation code, which was developed by Leon Lasdon and Alan Waren. More
technical information regarding the code can be found at [38]. The implementation of the
code can be found in Microsoft® Excel® 2007’s solver add-in.
In the optimisation code the conjugate search method is used because of the large number
of values that must be optimised. It uses less memory but takes more iterations to reach the
solution. The derivatives were computed using central differencing as opposed to forward
differencing. Central differencing takes more iterations to find a solution but it is more
accurate. The initial estimates were taken as tangent estimates instead of using quadratic
estimates. Quadratic estimates are only necessary for highly non-linear systems, which is
not the case for this research’s optimisation problem.
4.3.7 Optimisation Results
The rows in the transformation matrix T were arranged so that each row represents a specific
fault scenario:
1. Right aileron fault
2. Left aileron fault
3. Right elevator fault
4. Left elevator fault
5. Right rudder fault
6. Left rudder fault
The complexity of the fault and disturbance input matrices made choosing the weightings
c1, c2 and c3 an iterative process to find acceptable solutions. Table 4.1 gives a summary of
the final chosen values.
Specific Fault c1 c2 c3
Right aileron 5 1.6 1
Left aileron 5 1.6 1
Right elevator 5 0.8 1
Left elevator 5 0.8 1
Right rudder 5 0.4 1
Left rudder 5 0.4 1
Table 4.1: Summary of chosen weighting values.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. SECOND FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION METHOD: THE PARITY
SPACE APPROACH 66
T
he
so
lu
tio
ns
to
th
e
six
op
tim
isa
tio
n
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
ar
e
su
m
m
ar
ise
d
in
eq
ua
tio
n:
4.
3.
20
          T 1 T 2 T 3 T 4 T 5 T 6
          =
          0
.1
9
-0
.9
3
0
1
0
0.
23
0.
47
0
0.
30
0
0.
27
0.
2
0
0.
20
0
0.
3
0.
13
0
0.
16
0
0.
33
0.
09
3
0
0.
14
0
-0
.1
9
0.
93
0
1
0
-0
.2
3
-0
.4
7
0
0.
30
0
-0
.2
7
-0
.2
0
0.
20
0
-0
.3
-0
.1
3
0
0.
16
0
-0
.3
3
-0
.0
93
0
0.
14
0
0.
12
-1
0
0.
17
0
0.
14
0.
3
0
0.
05
0
0.
16
0.
07
0
0.
03
4
0
0.
19
0.
07
8
0
0.
02
7
0
0.
2
0.
05
8
0
0.
02
4
0
0.
12
-1
0
-0
.1
7
0
0.
14
0.
3
0
-0
.0
5
0
0.
16
0.
07
0
-0
.0
34
0
0.
19
0.
07
8
0
-0
.0
27
0
0.
2
0.
05
8
0
-0
.0
24
0
0.
01
9
-0
.0
93
0
0
0
0.
02
3
0.
04
7
0
0
0
0.
02
6
0.
02
0
0
0
0.
03
0.
01
3
0
0
1
0.
03
3
0.
00
93
0
0
0
-0
.0
19
0.
09
3
0
0
0
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
47
0
0
0
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
2
0
0
0
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
13
0
0
1
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
09
3
0
0
0
          
(4
.3
.2
0)
So
m
e
in
te
re
st
in
g
fe
at
ur
es
ar
e
fo
un
d
in
eq
ua
tio
n
4.
3.
20
.
So
m
e
of
th
e
co
lu
m
ns
ar
e
nu
lle
d
co
m
pl
et
el
y.
T
he
se
co
lu
m
ns
co
rr
es
po
nd
to
ro
w
s
th
at
ha
ve
no
sig
ni
fic
an
t
ad
va
nt
ag
e
fo
r
th
e
op
tim
isa
tio
n
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
ov
er
th
e
ot
he
r
ro
w
s
in
th
e
pr
im
ar
y
re
sid
ua
ls
(e
qu
at
io
n
4.
2.
34
).
A
no
th
er
fe
at
ur
e
fo
un
d
in
eq
ua
tio
n
4.
3.
20
is
th
at
th
e
va
lu
es
fo
rt
he
le
ft
an
d
rig
ht
ac
tu
at
or
pa
ir’
sr
ow
sa
re
id
en
tic
al
ex
ce
pt
fo
rs
om
e
va
lu
es
th
at
ch
an
ge
in
sig
n.
T
he
se
va
lu
es
co
rr
es
po
nd
to
pr
im
ar
y
re
sid
ua
ls
on
w
hi
ch
th
e
eff
ec
t
of
th
e
le
ft
an
d
rig
ht
ac
tu
at
or
s
ar
e
op
po
sit
e.
T
he
se
ro
w
s
th
er
ef
or
e
he
lp
in
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
di
sc
er
ni
ng
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
le
ft
an
d
rig
ht
ac
tu
at
or
.
T
he
va
lu
es
in
eq
ua
tio
n
4.
3.
20
th
at
ar
e
id
en
tic
al
co
rr
es
po
nd
to
ro
w
s
in
th
e
pr
im
ar
y
re
sid
ua
ls
th
at
he
lp
to
am
pl
ify
th
e
eff
ec
t
of
an
ac
tu
at
or
ty
pe
(s
uc
h
as
an
ai
le
ro
n)
irr
es
pe
ct
iv
e
of
w
he
th
er
it
is
a
le
ft
or
rig
ht
ac
tu
at
or
.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. SECOND FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION METHOD: THE PARITY
SPACE APPROACH 67
4.3.7.1 The Transformation Matrix
The final transformation matrix is then normalised so that each residual produces an amp-
litude of unity for a 1◦ of actuator deflection fault. This resulted in a final transformation
matrix of
T =

36.87T1
36.87T2
124.5T3
124.5T4
193.2T5
193.2T6

(4.3.21)
It is interesting to note that these scaling values roughly correspond to how well the sensors
associated with a particular fault scenario can detect that a fault has occurred. Note that
before normalisation the residuals are all corrupted by roughly the same amount of unknown
disturbances. When a higher value for a residual is required, a greater number of uncertainty
is contained in the residual. A higher value therefore indicates difficulty in detecting a fault
whereas a smaller value indicates that a fault can be detected more easily. According to the
results in equation 4.3.21 it is more difficult for a rudder fault to be detected by the set of
sensors than it is for an aileron fault.
4.4 Decision Process
The parity space method for FDI creates residuals of which the mean and variance can
increase when a fault has occurred, whereas in the bank of Kalman filters the most correct
Kalman filter in the bank will have the smallest residuals. A different decision process is
therefore required for the parity space FDI method.
The residuals’ mean and covariance depend on whether a fault is active, as well as on the
type of fault. When there is no faults the residuals should have a zero mean, as was discussed
in section 4.2. When actuator faults occur at zero locked-in-place deflection, the residuals
will still have a zero-mean, subject to straight and level flight. When a non-zero locked-
in-place fault occurs or the aircraft flies outside the straight and level trim condition, the
residuals will exhibit a non-zero mean. There is no prior information on which type of fault
will occur and therefore no information regarding how the mean of the residuals will change.
The accepted mean for both the healthy and faulty residual distributions will be chosen as
zero. The statistical parameters, mean and variance, of the residuals are healthy when no
faults are active and faulty when a fault is active.
However when a fault occurs, the variance of the particular residual pertaining to the specific
fault will increase. The residuals are also optimised to be sensitive to the specific fault and
less sensitive to disturbances and other faults. Hence the residual variance will reflect the
variance of the specific fault more closely. The decision process will therefore be specialised
to identify a change in residual variance to detect and isolate faults.
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4.4.1 The Cumulative Sum Procedure
The cumulative sum (CUSUM) procedure is one of the most powerful and yet simple tools
to detect a shift in statistical parameters [39]. The residuals generated by the parity space
approach are assumed normally distributed random variables. When a fault occurs the re-
siduals’ mean and variance change, given enough actuator excitation. The CUSUM method
is therefore suitable to detect these changes in each separate residual and assists in making
a fault decision.
The parity functions create sequential residuals at each time step. To derive an iterative
method for the CUSUM procedure start by assuming that the sequence of residuals are
random variables with a variance that changes when a fault has occurred. The first set
of residuals ri(1), ri(2), ..., ri(m) are assumed to belong to a healthy normal distribution
NH(µH , σ2H)i. Afterm time steps a fault occurs and the rest of the sequence ri(m+1), ri(m+
2), ..., ri(n) belongs to a faulty distributionNF (µF , σ2F )i whereNH(µH , σ2H)i 6= NF (µF , σ2F )i
and i represents the ith fault residual. Dropping the subscript i, the CUSUM procedure
signals that the shift has occurred for the first time [39] when
S(k) =
k∑
j=1
ln fF (r(j))
fH(r(j))
−min
n≤k
n∑
j=1
ln fF (r(j))
fH(r(j))
> L (4.4.1)
where fH and fF are densities corresponding to NF and NH respectively. The L is a con-
stant that determines the operating characteristics of the CUSUM procedure. The CUSUM
procedure in equation 4.4.1 is stated recursively as
S(k) = max
(
S(k − 1) + ln fF (r(k))
fH(r(k))
, 0
)
(4.4.2)
Equation 4.4.2 can be rescaled by dividing the logarithmic term and L parameter with the
same constant. This creates a procedure with the same characteristics that is easier to use.
Assume that the residual belongs to either the healthy normal distribution with variance
σ2H or a faulty normal distribution with variance σ2F = Cσ2H . This type of shift from σ2H
to Cσ2H is the simplest shift possible and accurately resembles real shifts in variance [39].
With this setup the logarithmic term in equation 4.4.2 becomes
ln fF (r(k))
fH(r(k))
= ln

1√
2piCσ2H
e(−0.5r
2(k)/(Cσ2H))
1√
2piσ2H
e(−0.5r2(k)/σ
2
H
)
 (4.4.3)
= ln
(
C−
1
2 e
(
−0.5
(
r(k)
σH
)2( 1C−1))) (4.4.4)
= −12 lnC + 0.5
(
r(k)
σH
)2(
1− 1
C
)
(4.4.5)
Note that the mean values are assumed to be zero as discussed previously. Substituting
equation 4.4.5 into 4.4.2 and rescaling it
S(k) = max
(
S(k − 1) +
(
r(k)
σH
)2
−K, 0
)
(4.4.6)
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where the CUSUM “leak” parameter becomes
K = ln(C)
(
C
C − 1
)
(4.4.7)
4.4.2 Final Decision Process
The healthy and faulty variance of each residual and each CUSUM’s K value must be found.
The residuals are influenced by both the disturbances and the faults. The variance of the
residuals are therefore influenced by a combination of the covariances of the disturbances
and faults. According to [40] the variance of a linear combination of random signals is given
by
Cov(AX) = AΣAT (4.4.8)
where A is a constant matrix and Σ is the covariance matrix of X. To find the covariance
matrix for the healthy set of residuals consider equation 4.3.3, noting that there are no faults
present
RH(k) = TΩ[LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n)] (4.4.9)
where TΩLw and TΩLv represent the linear transformation of the disturbance vectors
Nw(k, n) andNv(k, n) into the residuals respectively. From section 4.3.2 it was decided that
the disturbance vectors nw(k) and nv(k) are assumed to have identity covariance matrices.
Looking at equation 4.4.8 the healthy residual covariance matrix can be computed by
Cov(RH(k)) = ΣH (4.4.10)
= Cov (TΩ[LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n)]) (4.4.11)
= Cov (TΩLwNw(k, n)) + Cov (TΩLvNv(k, n)) (4.4.12)
= (TΩLw)ΣNw(k,n)(TΩLw)T + (TΩLv)ΣNv(k,n)(TΩLv)T (4.4.13)
= (TΩLw)I(TΩLw)T + (TΩLv)I(TΩLv)T (4.4.14)
This method of obtaining the healthy variances proved effective and compared well to the
healthy variances obtained through simulations. The variance for each fault residual was
found to be equal for the left and right actuator pairs. The covariances between left and
right residual pairs were also found to be strongly correlated, which makes sense as the
effect of a right actuator fault is similar to that of a left actuator fault. The calculated
healthy residual covariance matrix ΣH can be found in appendix D.1. It is interesting to
note that the variances are higher for the residuals that are concerned with the rudders and
lower for those concerned with the ailerons. The transformation matrix from equation 4.3.21
gives more weight to the rudder residuals and less to the aileron residuals. The disturbances
therefore have a greater effect on the residuals concerned with the rudders. The variances on
the rudder residuals are therefore expected to be higher. Other factors, such as the specific
values in the rows of T, also influence the variances obtained in equation D.1.2.
Looking at the residuals with the effect of the ith additive actuator fault without the effects
of other faults or disturbances, equation 4.3.3 can be written as
RF,i(k) = TΩL(i)f P
(i)(k, n) (4.4.15)
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where L(i)f is the fault input matrix made up of only the columns of Lf relating to the ith
fault and P(i) is the sequence of faults pertaining to only the ith fault
P(i)(k, n) =

fi(k − n)
fi(k + 1− n)
...
fi(k)
 (4.4.16)
In relation to equation 4.4.8 the variance of the residual due to only the ith fault is
Cov(RF,i(k)) = (ΣF,i)N(k,n)=0 (4.4.17)
= (TΩL(i)f )ΣP(i)(k,n)(TΩL
(i)
f )
T (4.4.18)
To obtain the faulty residual variance, examine the covariance matrix of the nondeterministic
additive fault
ΣP(i)(k,n) = E
[
(P(i)(k, n)− E[P(i)(k, n)])(P(i)(k, n)− E[P(i)(k, n)])T
]
(4.4.19)
simplifying P(i)(k, n) as Pk and fi(k − n) as f−n
ΣPk =

Var(f−n) Cov(f−n, f−n+1) · · · Cov(f−n, f0)
Cov(f−n+1, f−n) Var(f−n+1) Cov(f−n+1, f0)
... . . .
...
Cov(f0, f−n) Cov(f0, f−n+1) · · · Var(f0)
 (4.4.20)
Once a fault has occurred, the signal Pk+τ is assumed statistically stationary and τ is an
arbitrary lag time. Therefore all the variances in equation 4.4.20 are equal and all the
covariances with the same time shift will also be equal
Var(f−n) = Var(f−n+τ )
Cov(f−n, f−n+τ ) = Cov(f−n+c, f−n+τ+c)
}
τ, c ∈ N (4.4.21)
where c is also an arbitrary lag time. The problem of finding the covariance matrix in
equation 4.4.20 is reduced to finding the following n+ 1 covariances:
Var(fτ ) = Cov(fτ , fτ )
Cov(fτ , fτ+1)
...
Cov(fτ , fτ+n) (4.4.22)
The variance of Pτ is dependent on the type and size of the fault, whereas the covariances are
also dependent on the frequency of the fault. No prior information indicating the frequency
and amplitudes of the faults is available. A nominal fault frequency and amplitude must
therefore be chosen to determine the covariances. It is advantageous to choose a lower limit
on the fault amplitude that must be detected, because even if a low limit is chosen, a larger
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fault will still be detected even better by the CUSUM procedure. A too low limit however
can corrupt the quality of the procedure by allowing the disturbances to have a greater affect
on the fault decision.
A minimum fault amplitude of 1◦ (0.01745 rads) was chosen as the lower limit of fault
detection. The fault frequency was chosen as the lowest natural frequency of the aircraft
system. Determined from the eigenvalues of the continuous state matrix in equation 2.11.14,
the lowest frequency was 0.9 rad/s. From these parameters and remembering n = 5, the
following values were obtained for the fault covariances:
Var(fτ ) = 1.523× 10−4 (4.4.23)
Cov(fτ , fτ+1) = 1.522× 10−4 (4.4.24)
Cov(fτ , fτ+2) = 1.519× 10−4 (4.4.25)
Cov(fτ , fτ+3) = 1.514× 10−4 (4.4.26)
Cov(fτ , fτ+4) = 1.507× 10−4 (4.4.27)
Cov(fτ , fτ+5) = 1.498× 10−4 (4.4.28)
With equation 4.4.18 the covariance matrices of the faulty residuals for each different fault
were determined and can be found in appendix D.2. It is interesting to see that all the faulty
residuals have the same variance for the same size and type of fault. This is in line with
the objective of scaling the residuals so that a 1◦ fault would show an amplitude of 1. The
variance of σ2 = 0.5 is the same as the variance of a sinusoidal signal with an amplitude of
1. Note that these covariances do not reflect the effects of disturbances. The disturbances
are assumed to not change when a fault occurs and their statistical behaviour remains the
same. With disturbances
RF,i(k) = TΩ
[
L(i)f P
(i)(k, n) + LnN(k, n)
]
(4.4.29)
Cov(RF,i(k)) = Cov(TΩL(i)f P
(i)(k, n)) + Cov(TΩLnN(k, n)) (4.4.30)
∴ ΣF,i = (ΣF,i)N(τ,n)=0 + ΣH,i (4.4.31)
Note that the values in the healthy covariance matrices are higher than in the faulty (without
disturbances) case. This implies that the faults have a smaller effect than the disturbances.
The frequencies of the faults are assumed to be much lower than that of sensor noise and
other disturbances. If the residuals are put through a low pass filter the variance of the fault
should not decrease dramatically, but the high frequency disturbances from the sensors can
be attenuated.
The healthy covariance matrix was recalculated when the residuals were passed through
a low pass filter with a bandwidth of 2pi rad/s. The 2pi rad/s was seen to attenuate the
measurement noise significantly without losing much effect from the faults. The new healthy
covariance matrix was determined from simulation and can be found in appendix D.1. The
final faulty residuals covariance matrices can be found in appendix D.3.
The CUSUM procedure will focus only on determining a shift in each separate residual’s
variance. The covariance matrices in appendix D.3 give an indication of how faults can
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corrupt the residual not concerned with the fault at hand. How the decision process deals
with the coupling between the left and right actuator residual pairs are dealt with later in
this section. From the covariance matrices it is easy to determine the values for C by dividing
the faulty variances with the healthy variances. Note that the left and right actuator pairs
have the same C, K and L values.
CA = 49.29 (4.4.32)
CE = 20.5 (4.4.33)
CR = 5.88 (4.4.34)
∴ KA = 3.98 (4.4.35)
KE = 3.18 (4.4.36)
KR = 2.13 (4.4.37)
The values of L were determined to detect a fault in at least four seconds with the minimum
fault amplitude of 1◦. This was determined with the help of simulations as
LA = 130 (4.4.38)
LE = 120 (4.4.39)
LR = 120 (4.4.40)
A limit was also placed on the CUSUM procedure so that after a fault has occurred and
the system is back in a no-fault scenario, the decision process will be able to see that the
system is back to a no-fault scenario. The limits were chosen as double the CUSUM’s
respective L values so that the no-fault scenario can also be detected in a minimum time
of 4 seconds. The residuals have been optimised to be insensitive to other faults but there
are always some effects of the faults that spill into the other residuals. This phenomenon is
particularly visible in the left-right actuator pairs of all the CUSUMs, as can be seen in the
strong correlations in the covariance matrices in appendix D.3. To discern between the left
and right faults, another set of CUSUM procedures run in parallel. They do not have upper
limits imposed on them, but the CUSUM values are reset once the limited CUSUM process
have small values. This assists the decision process in distinguishing between the left and
right actuator pairs in the way described in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 represents a conceptual CUSUM procedure checking the variance of the left and
right actuator pairs respectively. The limited CUSUM procedure is used to detect if a fault
is active or inactive. A fault is declared active if a CUSUM has crossed the detection limit
L and a fault is declared inactive when no CUSUM is above that limit. The unlimited
CUSUM procedure is used when more than one CUSUM is above the detection limit. In
this case the maximum CUSUM in the unlimited CUSUM procedure is chosen as the active
fault scenario. This greatly increases the accuracy of the fault diagnosis. The unlimited
CUSUM procedure’s CUSUMs can increase to high levels when a fault is active for a long
enough time. Therefore when the limited CUSUM procedure’s CUSUMs are low enough, the
unlimited CUSUMs are reset. In figure 4.1 the right actuator developed a fault whereafter
both the left and right CUSUMs increased. The unlimited CUSUM procedure helped to
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Residuals
Limited CUSUM procedure
Fault active
Fault detected
Detection limit L
Reset limit
CUSUM upper
limit
No fault
detected
Right actuator 
CUSUM procedure
Left actuator 
CUSUM procedureUnlimited CUSUM procedure
Time [s]
S(
k)
S(
k)
Figure 4.1: Conceptual use of the CUSUM procedures to help with the decision process.
determine that the right actuator was at fault even though in the limited CUSUM procedure
there are times when the left actuator CUSUM is larger than the right.
4.5 Actuator Deflection Estimation
It is important to estimate the actuator deflection to be able to send the deflection angles
to the control re-allocation process when a fault is declared active. According to equation
4.2.34 and 4.2.35
Ω[L(i)f P
(i)(k, n) + LwNw(k, n) + LvNv(k, n)] = Ω[Y(k)− JU(k, n)] (4.5.1)
∴P(i)(k, n) =
(
ΩL(i)f
)−1
Ω[Y(k)− JU(k, n)− LwNw(k, n)− LvNv(k, n)] (4.5.2)
Note that no transformation matrix T is present. The transformation matrix was optimised
for the residuals only and not for actuator estimation.
Considering the fault variance and covariances, it is evident that the faults are strongly
correlated with itself in time. The fault can therefore be approximated as the average of the
fault vector P(i)(k, n) without a significant loss in accuracy. The bandwidth of the process
and measurement noise is assumed to be much higher than the bandwidth of the faults. A
low-pass filter can be used on equation 4.5.2 to lower the amplitude of the high frequency
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disturbance term. The ith fault can be estimated as
∴ P(i)(k, n) ≈
(
ΩL(i)f
)−1
Ω[Y(k)− JU(k, n)] (4.5.3)
fi(k) = mean
((
ΩL(i)f
)−1
Ω[Y(k)− JU(k, n)]
)
(4.5.4)
The
(
ΩL(i)f
)−1
term is a pseudo inverse of the rectangular matrix ΩL(i)f . The pseudo inverse
matrix represents a least squares best fit solution to the system of linear equations in 4.5.4
that calculates the ith actuator deflection fault from information from the sensors and the
actuator inputs. The actuator deflection is then estimated as the sum of the input signal
and the fault signal
δˆi = fi(k) + ui(k) (4.5.5)
It is interesting to note that the same phenomenon present in section 3.4.5 can be seen with
equation 4.5.4. Equation 4.5.4 is always calculating the ith actuator deflection fault to best
describe the observations from the sensors and inputs. This happens even though the ith
actuator is not at fault.
4.6 Simulations for the Parity Space FDI Method
The simulations for the parity space FDI method were run in MATLAB® R2008b with the
implementation of Simulink. The architecture of the Simulink model is shown in figure
4.2. The only difference between this simulation and the bank of Kalman filters’ simulation
(figure 3.3) is the different FDI module. The control system, aircraft model, process noise
and measurement noise are all the same.
References
Altitude
Vbar
Heading
Rudder
Non-Linear Discrete
System
Actuators
Thrust
FDI Sensors
Other Sensors
Measurement
Noise
Out
Fault
Simulator
In Out
Control System
h_c
vbar _c
heading_c
delta_r'
States
Actuators
Thrust
Control
Re-allocation
In
Fault Scenario
Actuator Deflections
Out
Parity Space FDI
u
y
Fault Decision
Estimated Actuator Deflections
Figure 4.2: The Simulink model used to simulate the performance of a parity space FDI method.
The same five simulated missions were conducted as for the bank of Kalman filters in section
3.4. The length of the simulation was kept at 400 seconds and the length of the active faults
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at 30 seconds each. The different flight missions that were simulated are repeated below.
They are:
1. Straight and level flight with minimal process noise
• 0◦ degree locked-in-place fault for each fault scenario
2. Straight and level flight with substantial process noise
• 0◦ degree locked-in-place fault for each fault scenario
3. A circular flight path that closely resembles the flight test trajectory
• 0◦ degree locked-in-place fault for each fault scenario
4. A zero-mean random generated flight mission that induces actuator excitation
• 0◦ degree locked-in-place fault for each fault scenario
5. Straight and level flight with minimal process noise
• 2.5◦ degree locked-in-place fault for each fault scenario
In the simulation results (section 4.6.1 to 4.6.5) a decision is declared if the value on the
graph is unity. The decision is undeclared when the value is zero. The desired behaviour of
the FDI system’s decision is to follow the actual fault scenario as closely as possible.
The parity space FDI should be able to estimate the actual actuator deflections. The
actuator deflection estimates will be shown for the last mission only (figure 4.8), as it clearly
shows the dynamics and performance of the actuator deflection estimation process.
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4.6.1 Simulation Results for a Straight and Level Flight with Minimal
Process Noise
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Figure 4.3: Fault decisions for a straight and level flight with minimal process noise.
In the case of a straight and level flight with minimal process noise, low actuator excitation
is expected. In figure 4.3 it can be seen that the FDI process could not isolate any faults.
This result was expected as no actuator had any significant level of excitation, while the
CUSUM method required some level of actuator excitation to detect faults.
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4.6.2 Simulation Results for a Straight and Level Flight with
Substantial Process Noise.
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Figure 4.4: Fault decisions for a straight and level flight with substantial process noise.
The extra process noise increases the performance of the FDI process significantly. The
aileron faults are detected after two seconds, but it takes another second to correctly dis-
cern which aileron is at fault. This can be attributed to the negative effect of unwanted
disturbances, which can lead to the wrong aileron CUSUM having a slightly higher value.
The right aileron CUSUM eventually increases enough and the correct isolation is done.
The removed aileron faults are detected after four seconds.
The elevator faults are detected after six seconds. The detection of a removed fault also
takes about six seconds.
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The rudder faults are isolated within four seconds and the removal of the fault is detected
after eight seconds. It takes a longer time to detect the removal of the rudder faults, since
the effect of disturbances on the rudder residuals are larger than on the other actuators.
Disturbances increase the residual variances and therefore can help with the detection of a
fault, but it hampers the detection of a removed fault.
4.6.3 Simulation Results for a Circular Flight Path that Closely
Resembles the Flight Test Trajectory.
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Figure 4.5: Fault decisions for a circular flight path that closely resembles the flight test trajectory.
For the circular flight trajectory the FDI isolated aileron faults within three seconds, as can
be seen in figure 4.5. Some expected confusion exists at the onset of the right aileron fault
but is quickly corrected. The aileron faults are declared removed after four seconds.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. SECOND FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION METHOD: THE PARITY
SPACE APPROACH 79
The elevator faults are also detected and isolated within three seconds and a removed elevator
fault detected after four seconds.
It is evident from figure 4.5 that the parity space method has trouble isolating rudder
faults. In this mission the aircraft is flying a circular trajectory, which creates biases in
the yaw and pitch rates of the aircraft. The parity space approach is designed around a
trim working condition. The manoeuvres of the aircraft allow it to fly outside the trim
conditions. This created unwanted parity space residual signals and subsequently degrades
the FDI performance.
4.6.4 Simulation Results for a Random Generated Flight Mission.
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Figure 4.6: Fault decisions for a randomly generated flight mission.
The randomly generated flight mission creates a substantial amount of actuator excitation.
As can be seen in figure 4.6 the FDI process performance is acceptable. The anomalies in
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the results are removed within one second and all the faults are isolated within two to five
seconds. All faults are correctly declared removed after seven seconds.
4.6.5 Simulation Results for a Randomly Generated Flight Mission,
but the Actuators Fail with a Locked-in-Place Fault of 2.5◦
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Figure 4.7: Fault decisions for a randomly generated flight mission where the actuators fail with
a locked-in-place fault of 2.5◦.
A 2.5◦ locked-in-place fault is much larger than the minimum 1◦ amplitude that the FDI
process is designed to detect. From figure 4.7 it is evident that the FDI performance increases
dramatically as actuator deflection increases and subsequently the parity space residuals
increase. All the faults are detected within one second and all faults declared removed
within seven seconds.
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The actuator deflection estimation for the parity space based approach for FDI is shown in
figure 4.8. In the figure the greyed out portions of the graphs are not sent to the control
re-allocation system. However, when a fault occurs, the estimated deflection of the actuator
is sent to the re-allocation process, which is indicated by the non-greyed out portions of
figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Actuator deflection estimation for a randomly generated flight mission where the
actuators fail with a locked-in-place fault of 2.5◦.
In figure 4.8 it can be seen that all the actuator deflections are accurately estimated when
that particular actuator is locked-in-place at 2.5◦. Here the actuator deflection estimates
are incorrect when other faults are active, similar to section 3.4.5. This is attributed to
the solution of equation 4.5.4 that consistently calculates an actuator deflection fault that
satisfies the observed inputs and outputs of the aircraft. Therefore when a fault occurs, the
other actuator estimators will estimate a deflection value for their particular actuator that
will result in the same aircraft behaviour that the original fault is causing.
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4.7 Fault Detection and Isolation Performance
In the previous section (4.6) the FDI performance for some typical flight situations was
demonstrated. In this section the quality of the parity space based approach to FDI will be
simulated for a broader arrangement of flight situations in the same manner as was done
with regards to the bank of Kalman filters in section 3.5.
The three arrangements will be repeated below:
1. The aerodynamic stability and control derivatives were changed to test for robustness.
A constant amount of natural actuator excitation and process noise was present.
2. The process noise was increased from zero to a substantial amount of wind to test for
robustness.
3. The actuator excitation was increased from zero to 3◦ amplitude on all actuators to
test for fault sensitivity.
All three arrangements were also tested for detection time.
4.7.1 The Effect of Parameter Changes on FDI Performance
The aerodynamic stability and control derivatives were changed from 90% of their original
values to 110% and the FDI performance was measured at intervals between these two
extremes. For this arrangement some natural actuator excitation was present, as well as a
nominal amount of process noise. The FDI performance is expected to be the greatest at
around 100% of the original values, as the parity space FDI was designed with these values
in mind.
From figure 4.9 it is clear that the lowest detection time and lowest false alarm rate is around
the 100% original aerodynamic values indicating the best FDI performance at this point,
as expected. When the aerodynamic derivatives change more than about 8% from their
original values, the FDI performance begins to degrade rapidly.
4.7.2 The Effect of Process Noise on FDI Performance
Process noise has two main effects on the performance of an FDI process. The first effect
is that the control system induces actuator excitation to reject the disturbances. A larger
amount of process noise therefore improves the FDI performance. However, the uncertainty
in process noise creates some confusion in the FDI system and too much process noise will
degrade the FDI performance.
From figure 4.10 it is evident that an increase in process noise improves the detection time as
the actuator excitation increases. The false alarms and the detection times however increase
as the process noise increases, degrading the FDI performance as expected.
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Figure 4.9: The effect of parameter changes on the parity space FDI performance.
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Figure 4.10: The effect of process noise on the parity space FDI performance.
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4.7.3 The Effect of Actuator Excitation on FDI Performance
Actuator excitation should have a positive effect on FDI performance, as discussed in section
3.3.1. Note that in figure 4.11 the effect of larger disturbance input matrices (representing
more wind) on the design of the parity space FDI is shown. The broken lines represent ave-
rage detection times and false alarm rates of the parity space FDI using different disturbance
input matrices for the design process. The solid lines represent the detection times and false
alarms for only the simulations using the nominal wind velocity of 2 m/s.
The effect of using larger values for expected wind is that the fault sensitivity and false
alarms decrease while the detection time increases.
From figure 4.11 it is seen that the aileron fault detection time decrease at lower actuator
excitation than the elevators. This implies that aileron faults are more easily detected than
elevator faults. The effectiveness of the parity space FDI to detect a rudder fault is similar
to that of detecting an elevator fault.
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Figure 4.11: The effect of actuator excitation on the parity space FDI performance.
In figure 4.11 it can clearly be seen that the average fault that is not detected becomes
larger (decreased fault sensitivity), as the design wind velocity increases. Another effect of
increasing the process noise used in the design procedure is the decrease in false alarms.
In figure 4.11 it can be seen that the performance of the FDI increases significantly with
actuator excitation. The FDI performance flattens out at 1◦ actuator amplitude at about 4
seconds detection time. However, with too much actuator excitation the FDI performance
starts to degrade. This is due to the fact that as the actuator excitation becomes larger,
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the aircraft tends to fly outside the trim conditions where non-linearities become significant.
The parity space approach is designed on an aircraft model that was linearised around the
trim conditions. FDI performance degradation is inevitable at large actuator excitations as
the non-linearities at large flight manoeuvres confuse the system.
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Flight Tests
Flight tests are an integral part of testing and understanding the theoretical work done as
part of this research. Two flight tests were conducted to test the performance of the two FDI
methods developed in this study, similar to the simulations run in section 3.4 and section
4.6. The first test was to fail different actuators with a 0◦ locked-in-place fault. The second
test was to fail different actuators with a 2.5◦ locked-in-place fault.
5.1 Physical Aircraft
The Meraka Modular UAV, which is shown in figure 5.1, is the aircraft on which the flight
tests were conducted. The mathematics regarding the dynamics of the aircraft were ex-
plained in chapter 2, and both the bank of Kalman filters and parity space FDI methods
were developed for use on the Meraka Modular UAV.
Figure 5.1: The Meraka Modular UAV.
The outcomes of the flight tests are dependent on the observable effect of the actuators on
the aircraft, quantified by the control derivatives. The use of AVL in computing the control
derivatives is only an approximation. Some expected behaviour however can be deduced
from investigating the geometry of the actuators on the actual aircraft.
86
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Right elevator
(Left elevator)
Figure 5.2: Physical right elevator at −2.5◦ deflection.
The elevators of the Meraka Modular UAV, shown in figure 5.2, are seen to cover small
areas relative to the area of the tailplane, but their moment arms around the yb-axis are
large. It is therefore expected that an elevator fault is mainly detectable through deviations
in Q (angular rate around the yb-axis). The problem is however that the elevators has a
small moment arm around the xb. The FDI uses the effect of the actuators around these
secondary moment arms, to discern between a left and right actuator fault, not only for the
elevator, but also for the rudders and ailerons. It is thus expected that discerning between
the left and right elevator will be difficult.
Right rudder
Figure 5.3: Physical right rudder at +2.5◦ deflection.
The right rudder is shown in figure 5.3 and it is seen to cover a small area relative to the
horizontal tail structure, but it has a large moment arm around the zb-axis indicating that
a rudder fault is mainly detected by deviations in R. The rudders however have a small
moment arm around the xb-axis. The moment of inertia is also greatest around the zb-axis
(see appendix A), which further reduces the effect of rudders on the dynamics of the aircraft.
It is therefore expected that detecting a rudder fault will be difficult in comparison with an
elevator or aileron fault. This phenomenon was also discovered through the development of
both FDI methods.
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Right aileron
Figure 5.4: Physical right aileron at +2.5◦ deflection.
The right aileron is shown in figure 5.4 and it has a large moment arm around the xb-axis
and less so around the yb-axis of the aircraft. Aileron faults are therefore expected to be
detected primarily by deviations in P . The aileron also covers a large area relative to the
elevators and rudders. It is thus expected that detecting an aileron fault would be easier
than detecting an elevator or rudder fault.
5.2 Details of the Flight Tests
The flight tests were conducted at the Helderberg Radio Flyers Club in the Western Cape
(South Africa). A flight plan document was compiled beforehand and reviewed with all
parties involved. The flight plan can be found in appendix E.
The flight tests were conducted to obtain data to be used by the two FDI methods developed
in the study. It was therefore necessary to deliberately fail the actuators at different times
and then to remove the fault after a set amount of time, similar to the simulations run in
section 3.4 and section 4.6. The sensors on board the aircraft then recorded the data as a
fault occurred. The faults were induced deliberately by sending a signal from the ground
station to the aircraft, giving specific details of the type of fault: which actuator to fail and
the duration of the fault.
The first test was to fly the aircraft and induce 0◦ locked-in-place faults (from trim) and
the second test was to induce 2.5◦ locked-in-place (from trim) faults.
5.2.1 Wind Conditions
The wind velocity on the test day (19 September 2012) was more than 2 m/s, as shown in
figure 5.5, which was much more than was anticipated in the research. In the graph it is
seen that the minimum and maximum wind gusts for the flight test periods were 2.3 m/s
and 7.7 m/s, respectively.
The flight tests were conducted in such weather conditions due to the fact that the weather
in the Western Cape is usually windy between August and March, and also because the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. FLIGHT TESTS 89
Maximum wind gust: 27.8 km/h = 7.7 m/s40
30
20
10
40
30
20
10
km
/h
km
/h
N
 2
3:
07
N
 2
3:
33
N
 2
3:
59
N
 0
0:
25
N
 0
0:
51
N
 0
1:
17
N
N
E
 0
1:
43
N
 0
2:
09
N
 0
2:
36
N
N
W
 0
3:
01
N
 0
3:
27
N
 0
3:
53
N
 0
4:
19
N
 0
4:
45
N
 0
5:
11
N
 0
5:
37
N
 0
6:
03
N
 0
6:
29
N
N
W
 0
6:
55
N
 0
7:
21
N
 0
7:
47
N
 0
8:
13
N
 0
8:
39
N
 0
9:
05
N
 0
9:
32
N
 0
9:
58
N
 1
0:
24
N
 1
0:
50
Cumulative duration
of the flight tests
(7:53 - 9:29)
Figure 5.5: Maximum and minimum wind gusts for Helderberg Radio Flyers Club on the morning
of 19 September 2012. (http://iweathar.co.za)
availability of a test venue, flight team, equipment and the Meraka Modular UAV is limited.
The windy conditions also allowed testing the FDI systems for robustness.
The measured values for the wind gust velocities found in figure 5.5 were taken on top of
the Helderberg Radio Flyers’ clubhouse at an altitude of 3 m. In the lower atmosphere wind
shear becomes prevalent, causing wind velocities to slow down close to the surface of the
earth. From historical data, obtained by previous flight tests done by the ESL, it was found
that the wind velocity can increase up to twofold from where the wind velocity is measured
by the club to where the aircraft operates at a higher altitude.
The two FDI methods were therefore recalibrated with higher process noise values in the
process noise covariance matrix for the Kalman filters and higher values for the healthy
covariance matrices in the parity space method. The effect in the parity space method is
mainly to change the CUSUM parameters and not so much the optimisation solutions. The
higher process noise was set to account for the wind velocity at where the aircraft operates:
at 15 m/s. The conservative higher value for the wind velocity was used, because the wind
is not the only factor that affects the process noise. Unmodelled dynamics and differences
in aircraft parameters all have an effect on how the process noise influences the system.
According to the simulation results of figure 3.12 and figure 4.11, the FDI methods will have
less fault sensitivity because of the higher expected (design) wind gust velocity used in the
recalibration process.
5.2.2 Flight Trajectory
The aircraft was flown with complete manual pilot control in a race track trajectory as
shown in figure 5.6. No automated control loops were introduced during the flight tests.
For one half of the path the aircraft operated without a fault, represented in figure 5.6 as
the thin black line. For the other half of the path a fault was induced by the ground station
and radio controller, represented in figure 5.6 as the thick red line. This circular trajectory
was repeated until all the faults were induced.
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Flight Trajectory
No-fault
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Figure 5.6: Flight trajectory for both flight tests as seen from above.
5.3 Results for the First Flight Test
The first flight was concerned with 0◦ locked-in-place faults. Table 5.1 summarises the events
of the first flight test that was conducted on the 19th of September 2012.
Event
start
time [s]
Event
end
time [s]
Event description
35.6 65.6 Fail left aileron at 0◦ locked-in-place
90.32 123.52 Fail right aileron at 0◦ locked-in-place
146.84 180.92 Fail left elevator at 0◦ (from trim) locked-in-place
204.44 236.92 Fail right elevator at 0◦ (from trim) locked-in-place
261.76 292.12 Fail left rudder at 0◦ locked-in-place
316.32 347.36 Fail right rudder at 0◦ locked-in-place
Table 5.1: First test flight event summary.
The fault decisions for the two FDI methods are summarised in figures 5.7 and 5.9 re-
spectively. It is desirable that the line representing the fault decision follows the real fault
scenario as closely as possible. The high levels of process noise, as well as unmodelled
dynamics and inevitable differences in aircraft parameters, may however affect the outcome
in a negative manner.
The actuator deflection estimates are illustrated in figures 5.8 and 5.10 for the two FDI
methods. The high wind velocity and differences in aircraft parameters should also adversely
affect the actuator deflection estimates in an interesting manner that will be discussed below.
5.3.1 FDI Results Using the Bank of Kalman Filters
In figure 5.7 the fault decisions along with the fault probabilities are shown. It can be seen
that aileron faults are detected and discernable as expected. Looking at the probabilities of
the faults, some confusion is seen at the onset of an aileron fault as the filters decide if the
left or right aileron is at fault. The FDI takes between five and ten seconds to detect that
an aileron is at fault.
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Figure 5.7: Fault decisions using the bank of Kalman filters FDI.
As seen in the fourth and fifth row in figure 5.7, the FDI has difficulty detecting the elevator
faults. It also has difficulty deciding if the left or right elevator is at fault, causing a long
delay before a fault decision is made. This is precisely what was expected, as was discussed
in section 5.1. The FDI takes 25 seconds to correctly detect an elevator fault.
In the two last rows of figure 5.7 the fault decisions regarding the rudder faults are displayed.
It is interesting to note that both rudder faults were detected even though it was expected
to be difficult. It must be noted however that the rudders are excited at the same time as
when the faults occur, as can be seen in figure 5.8’s last two rows. The large extra actuator
excitation made the rudder faults detectable, as was expected. The FDI takes between seven
and ten seconds to detect a rudder fault.
Figure 5.8 displays the actuator deflection estimates as determined by the bank of Kalman
filters. The non-greyed out areas represent estimated deflections when a fault occurs.
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Figure 5.8: Actuator deflection estimates using the bank of Kalman filters FDI.
Note that the actuator deflections are estimated with some error, especially the rudder
deflection estimates. The large error in the estimates can be attributed to the fact that the
Kalman filters always try and calculate an actuator deflection estimate that will produce
the same dynamic effect as that being observed through the sensors. This means that the
estimators are trying to quantify the effect of a fault, but also the effect of disturbances,
through its estimate. With such large wind gusts present, the estimators are focussing more
on determining an actuator deflection that would produce the same wind effect, instead of
focussing on the effect of a fault. This will always be the case once the effect of disturbances
are greater than the effect of faults.
The light grey area in figure 5.8 represents the right elevator deflection estimates when the
FDI incorrectly detected a right elevator fault. It shows that the estimated value for the
right elevator will incorrectly be sent to the re-allocation process, but that the estimate is
still reasonably correct.
The aileron and elevator deflection estimates resemble the true deflection, once a fault has
occurred, within a 2◦ margin. The rudder estimates on the other hand have about a 10◦
error margin. This is due to the fact that the control derivatives of a rudder are less than
that of the ailerons and elevators, and the moment of inertia is greatest around the zb-axis
(see appendix A). The effect is that the estimator needs to estimate larger values of rudder
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deflection to produce the same disturbance effects.
5.3.2 FDI Results Using Parity Space
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Figure 5.9: Fault decisions using parity space FDI.
Figure 5.9 displays the decisions of the parity space FDI method for the first flight test.
In the second and third rows of figure 5.9, the decisions regarding an aileron fault are shown.
It can be seen that the FDI can detect aileron faults within five seconds and can also discern
between the left and right aileron.
In the fourth and fifth rows of figure 5.9, the FDI has difficulty detecting elevator faults, as
well as discerning between the left and right elevator, as was expected. The FDI takes 23
seconds to correctly detect an elevator fault.
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The parity space FDI correctly detects rudder faults in less than five seconds, as can be seen
in figure 5.9. Even though the wind disturbance on the aircraft is large and the rudders are
difficult to detect, the extra actuator excitation seen in figure 5.10’s last two rows empower
the FDI to detect the rudder faults.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-10
0
10
Right Aileron 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-10
0
10
Left Aileron  
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-10
0
10
Right Elevator
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-10
0
10
Left Elevator 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-10
0
10
Right Rudder  
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-10
0
10
Left Rudder   
Time [s]
 
 
True deflections
(in degrees)
Estimated deflections
(in degrees)
Figure 5.10: Actuator deflection estimates using parity space FDI.
Figure 5.10 summarises the actuator deflection estimates calculated with the parity space
method. The non-greyed out areas represent the deflection estimates when the specific
actuator fault occurs. The light grey area represents the right elevator deflection estimates
when the FDI incorrectly detected a right elevator fault. It shows that the estimated value
for the right elevator will incorrectly be sent to the re-allocation process, but that the
estimate is still reasonably correct.
In figure 5.10 it is seen that the estimates do not follow the true actuator deflections,
especially for the rudder. This is due to the fact that equation 4.5.4 is trying to find the
solution to a fault that will create the same effect that the faults and disturbances have on
the aircraft. Since the wind disturbances are larger than the effect of an actuator fault, the
effect of wind greatly overshadows the effect of faults in the estimate solution.
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5.4 Results for the Second Flight Test
The second flight was concerned with 2.5◦ locked-in-place faults. Table 5.2 summarises the
events of the second flight test that was conducted on the 19th of September 2012.
Event
start
time [s]
Event
end
time [s]
Event description
28.96 63.4 Fail left aileron at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place
87.72 120.70 Fail right aileron at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place
145 182.2 Fail left elevator at negative 2.5◦ (from trim) locked-in-place
204.6 238.7 Fail right elevator at negative 2.5◦ (from trim) locked-in-place
263.2 289.08 Fail left rudder at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place
311.44 339.6 Fail right rudder at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place
Table 5.2: Second test flight event summary.
The fault decisions of the bank of Kalman filters FDI and parity space FDI are shown in
figure 5.11 and 5.13 respectively. The preferred behaviour of the decisions is to follow the
real fault scenario (broken line) as closely as possible.
The actuator deflection estimates for the two FDI processes are displayed in figure 5.12
and 5.14. The high wind velocities should adversely affect the correctness of estimating the
actuator deflections.
The unavoidable differences in aircraft parameters between the real aircraft and the mathe-
matical model developed in this research should adversely impact the performance of the
FDIs.
5.4.1 FDI Results Using the Bank of Kalman Filters
Figure 5.11 shows the fault decisions that the bank of Kalman filters made with regard to
2.5◦ locked-in-place faults.
The second and third rows in figure 5.11 clearly indicate that an aileron fault can be detected
and that the left and right fault can be discerned correctly. The aileron faults were detected
in under seven seconds.
The fourth and fifth rows in figure 5.11 display the fault decision regarding the elevator
faults. It is seen that an elevator fault is detected in under ten seconds, but that the system
incorrectly diagnosed the fault at 145s as a right elevator fault instead of a left elevator
fault. This is what was expected, as was discussed in section 5.1.
In the last two rows of figure 5.11 it can be seen that no rudder faults are detected. This
is due to the fact that 2.5◦ rudder deflection is too little actuator excitation for the FDI to
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Figure 5.11: Fault decisions using the bank of Kalman filters FDI.
detect. Recall that the bank of Kalman filters were recalibrated with a higher process noise
covariance matrix that decreased the fault sensitivity of the FDI system.
In figure 5.12 the estimated actuator deflections using the bank of Kalman filters are shown.
The desired behaviour of the estimators should be to correctly estimate the actuator deflec-
tions when a fault has occurred (the non-greyed out areas). The light grey area represents
the right elevator deflection estimates when the FDI incorrectly detected a right elevator
fault. It shows that the estimated value for the right elevator will incorrectly be sent to the
re-allocation process and that the deflection estimate is incorrect. The estimate however
resembles the faulty left elevator deflection.
It is seen in figure 5.12 that the actuator deflections are estimated with some error. The
aileron and elevator deflections are estimated within a 2◦ margin and the rudder estimates
are estimated within a 10◦ margin.
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Figure 5.12: Actuator deflection estimates using the bank of Kalman filters FDI.
Note however that the estimation follows the low frequency movement of the true actuator
deflections to some extent. The effect of higher wind velocity is that it becomes more pre-
valent than the effect of the fault. This unwanted effect of the wind and other disturbances
causes the filters to estimate misleading deflections since they are a combination of the fault
and disturbances effects.
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5.4.2 FDI Results Using Parity Space
Figure 5.13 illustrates the decisions made by the parity space FDI regarding the fault sce-
narios of the second flight test.
In figure 5.13’s second and third rows it is seen that the FDI can accurately detect aileron
faults within four seconds. This was the expected behaviour of the FDI.
The elevator fault decisions, displayed in the fourth and fifth rows of figure 5.13, demonstrate
that an elevator fault is detected within seven seconds, but that the FDI cannot distinguish
between the left and right elevator. This is in accordance with what was discussed in section
5.1.
No rudder faults are detected in figure 5.13, because the recalibration of the FDI using larger
values for the disturbance input matrix. This caused the fault sensitivity to decrease and
therefore the 2.5◦ actuator excitation was insufficient to detect the rudder faults.
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Figure 5.13: Fault decisions using parity space FDI.
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Figure 5.14: Actuator deflection estimates using parity space FDI.
Figure 5.14 displays the actuator deflection estimates determined by the parity space equa-
tions 4.5.4 and 4.5.5. The non-greyed out areas represent where a fault has occurred and
where the estimators should estimate the same value as the true actuator deflection. The
light grey area represents the right elevator deflection estimates when the FDI incorrectly
detected a right elevator fault. It shows that the estimated value for the right elevator will
incorrectly be sent to the re-allocation process and that the deflection estimate is incorrect.
The estimate however resembles the faulty left actuator deflection.
In figure 5.14 we see that the aileron and elevator estimators follow the low frequency signal
of the true deflections with a margin of error of about 2◦. The rudder deflection estimates
on the other hand have an error margin of 10◦. The low frequency behaviour originates from
inherent low-pass filtering present in the parity space FDI. The error margin quantifies the
effect that wind has on the aircraft above the effect of an actual fault. Therefore higher winds
would adversely affect the actuator deflection estimates in the same manner as described in
section 5.3.
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Comparison of the Two Fault
Detection and Isolation Methods
6.1 Simulation Results
Note that the FDI system used to obtain the simulation results shown in this section was
designed using an expected (design) wind velocity of 2 m/s. The simulation results obtained
in section 3.5.1 for the bank of Kalman filters and section 4.7 for the parity space approach
are compared in this section. The comparison will focus on detection times and false alarms
of the average values illustrated in figures 3.10 to 3.12 and 4.9 to 4.11.
6.1.1 FDI Performance Comparison in Terms of Parameter Change
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Figure 6.1: FDI performance of the two FDI methods in terms of changing parameter values.
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In figure 6.1 the average performance of the bank of Kalman filters and the parity space
FDI is displayed. The figure indicates that the parity space FDI can tolerate larger changes
in the aircraft’s parameters.
Recall from equations 3.2.6 to 3.2.10 that the Kalman gains are calculated with the statistical
information of the measurement and process noise. The variance of the disturbances are
therefore the determining factor for the dynamics of the bank of Kalman filters. The bank
of Kalman filters are also dependent on the system states.
On the other hand the parity space design procedure requires an optimisation process that
is optimised specifically for actuator FDI. The parity space method also requires the null
matrix of the observability matrix that decreases the sensitivity of the states to the parity
relations.
The parity space is optimised specifically for FDI and the insensitivity towards disturbances,
and is independent of system states. It therefore gives it more robustness in terms of
parameter changes, as can be seen in figure 6.1.
6.1.2 FDI Performance Comparison in Terms of Process Noise
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Figure 6.2: FDI performance of the two FDI methods in terms of process noise.
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the effect of increased induced process noise on the performance
of both the bank of Kalman filters FDI and the parity space FDI. Recall that additional
process noise induces extra actuator excitation, which assists the FDI process.
In figure 6.2 it can be seen that the detection times of the parity space method deliver
superior results as opposed to that of the bank of Kalman filters at intermediate amounts
of wind. The increased effectiveness of the parity space at moderate amounts of process
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. COMPARISON OF THE TWO FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
METHODS 102
noise can be attributed to the same robustness properties as were discussed in section 6.1.1,
where the focus of the parity space FDI design procedure is to optimise specifically for FDI.
At high process noise however, the detection times of the parity space FDI start to increase
to levels above that of the bank of Kalman filters. This is due to the fact that at high
process noise levels the aircraft tends to fly outside the linear region of the flight envelope.
The extended Kalman filters in the bank of Kalman filters are designed to tolerate the non-
linearities in these regions, whereas the parity space FDI is not. Consequently the parity
space FDI’s performance degrades significantly at high values of process noise.
The false alarm rates for both FDI methods increase as the amount of process noise increases.
The process noise does induce extra actuator excitation, which assists in the FDI process,
but the process noise also affects the aircraft in unpredictable ways. At higher values of the
process noise the uncertainty of the disturbance creates a higher number of false alarms.
This is true for both FDI methods.
Figure 6.2 shows that in general the parity space has shorter detection times but more false
alarms than the bank of Kalman filters. From this it can be seen that the sensitivity of the
parity space to faults is higher. There is thus a trade-off between the desired detection time
and number of false alarms.
6.1.3 FDI Performance Comparison in Terms of Actuator Excitation
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Figure 6.3: FDI performance of the two FDI methods in terms of actuator excitation.
In figure 6.3 the effect of increased actuator excitation is illustrated on the FDI performance
of the two FDI methods developed in this research, where the detection times are very
similar. However, at high amounts of actuator excitation the parity space method’s detection
time and false alarm rate start to increase. At high levels of actuator excitation, the aircraft
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tends to fly in a more non-linear region of its flight envelope. The parity space is a linear FDI
process, whereas the extended Kalman filters were designed to handle the non-linearities in
these non-linear regions. The bank Kalman filters show superior FDI performance in terms
of false alarm rates.
6.2 Flight Tests Results
The results of the flight tests are shown graphically in figures 5.7 to 5.14. Tables 6.1 and
6.2 summarise the FDI performance measures of the flight tests in terms of detection time
and incorrect detections. In each column two values are given, separated by a slash, where
the left value indicates the detection time and the right value indicates the number of
incorrect detections for the specific actuator. The number of false alarms are not shown
as no false alarms were detected. Note that a false alarm represents a detection when no
fault is present, whereas a incorrect detection indicates a fault that occurred, but which was
isolated incorrectly.
Recall that the two FDI methods were recalibrated with a higher design wind velocity. It is
therefore expected that the fault sensitivity of the FDI processes will decrease as discussed
in chapter 5.
Performance measure Actuator Bank of Parity space
Kalman filters
Right aileron 4.6 / 0 4.44 / 0
Left aileron 9.8 / 0 4.64 / 0
Detection time [s] / Right elevator 24 / 1 22.88 / 1
# of incorrect detections Left elevator - / 0 9.4 / 0
Right rudder 7.2 / 0 4.88 / 0
Left rudder 9.92 / 0 5.16 / 0
Table 6.1: FDI performance of first flight test.
From table 6.1 it is evident that the detection times for the parity space FDI method is less
than the detection times in the bank of Kalman filters FDI. This corresponds well with the
simulation results summarised in figures 6.2 and 6.3.
In figure 5.9’s second and third rows it can be seen that the aileron faults are detected within
five seconds, but that the faults are missed for some instances when the fault is active. This
decrease the quality of the detection, but is still adequate.
Table 6.1 shows that the incorrect detection is triggered when the left elevator fails. Both the
bank of Kalman filters and the parity space FDI incorrectly detected a right aileron fault.
The inability of both FDI methods to correctly detect a left elevator fault is attributed
to the fact that although an elevator fault is detectable, the FDI methods have difficulty
distinguishing between the left and right elevator pair, as discussed in section 5.1. The
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parity space method, however, does detect a left elevator fault for a short period of time,
whereas the bank of Kalman filters missed the left elevator fault completely.
From figures 5.7, 5.11, 5.9 and 5.13 it is noted that the time it takes the parity space method
to detect that a fault is removed is longer than the time it takes the bank of Kalman filters.
This is due to the fact that the bank of Kalman filters have a filter specially designed for the
no-fault case, whereas the parity space FDI does not produce a residual that is optimised
for a no-fault scenario. The CUSUM procedure in the parity space must therefore “leak”
until the fault detection is removed, which takes a longer than in the bank of Kalman filters.
According to [8] the time it takes to detect that a fault has been removed is not an important
FDI performance parameter.
Performance measure Actuator Bank of Parity space
Kalman filters
Right aileron 6.38 / 0 4.36 / 0
Left aileron 5.28 / 0 3.04 / 0
Detection time [s] / Right elevator 8.6 / 1 6.48 / 1
# of incorrect detections Left elevator - / 0 - / 0
Right rudder - / 0 - / 0
Left rudder - / 0 - / 0
Table 6.2: FDI performance of second flight test.
Table 6.2 summarises the fault performance measurements obtained by the two FDI methods
on the second flight test. Note again that the results here were obtained by designing the
FDIs with a higher design wind velocity and therefore it should be expected that the fault
sensitivity of both FDIs should decrease.
In table 6.2 only the aileron faults and a right elevator fault were detected. Of these three
faults, the bank of Kalman filters took longer to detect a fault than the parity space FDI.
This corresponds to the graphs in figures 6.2 and 6.3. The parity space method and bank
of Kalman filters however made an incorrect elevator detection. This strengthens the belief
that it is difficult to isolate an elevator fault on the Meraka Modular UAV, even though the
presence of an elevator fault is detected. The left elevator fault was not detected due to the
difficulty with which the FDI methods discern between right and left elevator faults, as was
discussed previously.
The rudder faults were undetected, as seen in table 6.2, because 2.5◦ was too small an
amount of actuator excitation to assist the FDI systems in detecting these faults. This
is what was expected, since the recalibrated FDI systems should cause a decreased FDI
sensitivity to faults.
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6.3 Comparison to Other Literature
In [2] a bank of extended Kalman filters was implemented to detect actuator faults for left
and right ailerons, left and right elevators and one rudder. The actuators were failed at near
trim conditions in a MATLAB® / Simulink® simulation with a non-linear autopilot which
regulated the velocity, altitude and the attitude of the aircraft. Only the detection times
were given and table 6.3 summarises the FDI performance of the simulated system.
Actuator Detection Time [s]
Right Aileron 24
Left Aileron 20
Right Elevator 11
Left Elevator 18
Rudder 1
Table 6.3: FDI performance on the simulations in [2].
It must be noted that the simulation done in [2] was with low process noise that induced
some actuator excitation. The simulations in this thesis that represent the results in table
6.3 the closest, is between mission 1 and mission 2 of sections 3.4 and 4.6.
The results in table 6.3 indicate that the FDI methods developed in this research perform
relatively well, especially in terms of the aileron faults, which are detected faster than the
24 seconds in [2]. One observation that can be made is that the rudder fault is detected
within one second. The speedy response to a rudder fault in table 6.3 is due to the fact
that only one rudder is present. The FDI system therefore does not have to waste time and
effort discerning between the left and right rudder.
6.4 Noteworthy Differences
The differences between the bank of Kalman filters and the parity space FDI stem from the
way in which their residuals are generated and how their decision processes are set up.
The bank of Kalman filters use several different extended Kalman filters to estimate the
actuator deflections and then predict the observed sensor values. The non-linear extended
Kalman filters allow the FDI to be more robust in terms of larger aircraft manoeuvres. The
Kalman filters are however susceptible to instability if it is not design carefully.
The parity space on the other hand is an FDI process designed around a certain working
point, usually the trim condition of the aircraft. The parity space method’s performance
therefore degrades once the aircraft flies outside the sufficiently linear region of the flight en-
velope. The parity space is however a stable residual generator if the linearised mathematical
state space representation of the system is stable.
The residuals created by the bank of Kalman filters represent the relative error that each
filter within has with regard to the actual state of the system. The filter with the smallest
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residual therefore represents the filter that is most likely to represent the correct fault
scenario. The parity space approach on the other hand is optimised so that each fault
creates a distinct effect on certain residuals. Therefore specific larger residuals indicate
specific faults.
The consequence of different residuals between the FDI methods requires that different
decision processes have to be used. The bank of Kalman filters send its residuals to a
Bayes classifier (discussed in section 3.3.1), which uses the statistical information supplied
by the extended Kalman filters to determine the most likely fault scenario. The parity space
capitalises on the fact that the variance of the correct residual increases when a fault occurs.
The CUSUM method (discussed in section 4.4.2) then use these residuals together with
predefined statistical information to determine the most likely actuator fault scenario. Both
the decision processes use the variance of the residuals to help determine the active fault
scenario. The extended Kalman filter however determines the statistical information more
accurately and in real time, which gives it some advantage over the parity space method.
The parity space method on the other hand does not have to determine all the statistical
information or Kalman gains in real time as the extended Kalman filters have to. The
parity space method therefore uses much less computational power as the null space of the
observability matrix, as well as the optimisation of the transformation matrix (discussed in
section 4.3), can be determined beforehand.
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Recommendations and Conclusion
7.1 Recommendations
The recommendations proposed in this section are focused on improving the FDI and con-
trol re-allocation processes that were developed in this research and at the ESL. These
recommendations did not fall in the scope of this study but can be used in future research.
7.1.1 Different Failure Modes
In figure 1.1 (section 1.2.1) different actuator failure modes were described. It is recom-
mended that actuator deflection estimators be developed that can estimate different types
of faults, such as floating faults or effectiveness faults. A control re-allocation process can
then be researched that can also accommodate such faults. From the simulations done in
sections 3.4 and 4.6, it is seen that the estimates follow the true actuator deflections and the
investigation into a re-allocation process that can handle other types of faults seems viable.
7.1.2 Process Noise Estimation
One of the shortcomings of the FDI development done thus far in the research was the de-
pendence of the design on the expected process noise. The robustness of both FDI processes
are dependent on the correlation between the expected process noise and the actual process
noise present when the aircraft is flying.
One solution to this problem would be to estimate the process noise in flight, and then by
means of gain scheduling, or other methods, to adapt the process noise covariance matrix
in the bank of Kalman filters or the CUSUM parameters in the parity space FDI.
A proposed method would be to use any available real time wind data from locations near
the flight test airports and radio flyer clubs to determine the process noise from the wind
velocities. The problem with this approach is the unknown availability and accuracy of the
data, as well as excluding other process noise influences.
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In [33] several methods are described that can help in estimating the amount of process
noise. Note that a fault itself has an effect on the estimated process noise through these
methods and must be taken into account.
7.1.3 Non-Linear Parity Space FDI
One of the shortcomings found in the performance of the parity space FDI was the inability
to operate effectively outside the linear trim region of the aircraft’s flight envelope. It is
highly recommended that the possibility of a non-linear parity space method for actuator
FDI be investigated.
7.1.4 Practical implementation of the FDI methods
The research shows that the FDI methods are reliable for detecting and isolating aileron
faults, but as the process noise increases, the FDI performance in terms of detecting elevator
and rudder faults starts to decrease. It is recommended that the Meraka Modular UAV
be equipped with an FDI module that focuses on specific faults in accordance with the
estimated process noise. At low process noise, all actuators can be eligible for FDI, but at
higher process noise it is recommended that only aileron faults be detected. When too much
process noise is detected, the FDI module can be switched off.
It was found that it was difficult to isolate an elevator fault, but detecting an elevator fault
is not that difficult for any of the two FDI methods. If the need arises to use this research’s
FDIs to detect elevator faults at high process noise levels, it is recommended not to also try
and accomplish isolation.
FDI considerations on other aircraft however, must be by analysed separately to determine
the effectiveness of the FDI methods for their specific actuators.
7.2 Active Fault Detection and Isolation
The suggested improvement in this section focuses on extra actuator excitation that could
not be tested on flight tests, but would be able to improve the FDI performance of both the
bank of Kalman filters and parity space FDI.
The aim of active fault FDI is to artificially excite the actuators and therefore obtain more
effective FDI performance when a fault occurs. The disadvantage of this procedure is that
the aircraft loses some of its manoeuvrability, there is more wear on the actuators, and
more energy is required to artificially excite the actuators. There are numerous ways of
constructing the signal to artificially excite the actuators. In [13] the individual external
actuator signals are chosen to reduce the overall dynamic effects that the external excitation
has on the system, while still sufficiently exciting the actuators. In [2] external excitation is
only used when the system suspects a fault but is still not sure the fault has occurred. This
method improves the performance of the FDI by dramatically lowering the false alarm rate,
but missed detections are still prevalent.
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A simulation was run in MATLAB® R2008b with the implementation of Simulink. The
same Simulink architecture was used as in chapters 3 and 4. The control system added
an extra control signal to each actuator. The aim of this simulation was to demonstrate
the improvement in performance that external excitation has on FDI and therefore a simple
excitation signal is adopted. The extra excitation is a basic sinusoidal signal of 1◦ amplitude
with a frequency of 2pi4 rad/s. The minimum amplitude that must be detected is chosen as
an 1◦ actuator fault.
The simulation was run only on the straight and level flight with minimal process noise as
this was the mission with the worst case FDI performance.
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Figure 7.1: The bank of Kalman filters FDI decisions where extra actuator excitation was added.
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Figure 7.2: Parity space FDI decisions where extra actuator excitation was added.
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In figures 7.1 and 7.2 it is evident that extra actuator excitation significantly increases FDI
performance as was expected throughout this research.
7.3 Conclusion
One of the advantages of using the bank of Kalman filters for FDI is that it is prone to
fewer false alarms in comparison to the parity space method. On the other hand it is
less sensitive to faults and consequently produces more missed detections. The possible
instability associated with the extended Kalman filters used in this research requires using
this method carefully, especially when extreme flight manoeuvres are expected. An added
disadvantage is the higher amount of processing power required to run a bank of Kalman
filters on board the aircraft. However, one of the major advantages of the bank of Kalman
filters is the ability to manage the non-linearities of aircraft flight much better than the
parity space approach to FDI.
The parity space method for FDI is seen to have higher fault sensitivity and is therefore
able to detect faults faster than the bank of Kalman filters. The parity space approach,
however, is a linear process designed around the trim condition of the aircraft. This fact,
coupled with the system’s higher sensitivity to faults, causes it to produce more false alarms.
The main advantage of the parity space method is the design freedom that it grants the
designer. All the analytical redundancies of the system are determined and contained in the
parity relations. The FDI designer can then use a simple optimisation process to compute a
transformation matrix that transforms the parity relations into any desired residuals. The
added advantage of this design procedure is that it uses less computational power than the
bank of extended Kalman filters.
One of the conclusions of this research is that no one of these methods is necessarily better
than the other. The type of aircraft, expected flight envelope and available computational
power are all considerations that should aid in deciding which FDI method is better for the
specific task at hand. If the aircraft is expected to fly excessive manoeuvres and has enough
computational power on board, the bank of Kalman filters is the recommended choice for
FDI. If the aircraft’s computational power is limited and the aircraft is expected to fly near
its trim conditions, the parity space method for FDI is a viable option.
One of the main conclusions that was reached in this research was that the greatest design
parameters are the expected amount of measurement and process noise. For all practical
considerations, the measurement noise is expected to be less than the process noise to such
an extent that the process noise becomes the dominant design parameter. The process noise
quantifies several unknown quantities that include the expected wind gust velocity, unmo-
delled dynamics and effects of different aircraft parameters. It is unfortunately impossible
to know the exact amount of process noise, as well as its statistical behaviour. The FDIs
developed in this research have shown to perform as expected despite these challenges.
From the research some conclusions can be drawn with regard to the Meraka Modular UAV.
For this specific aircraft it was shown that even in the presence of large wind gusts, aileron
faults could be correctly detected. It was also shown that both FDI methods had difficulty
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correctly discerning between the left and right elevator. The FDIs were demonstrated to
have decreased sensitivity to rudders faults, so that high amounts of actuator excitation
were required to detect rudder faults.
The actuator deflection estimates were shown to be very susceptible to the effects of process
noise, especially the rudders. The conclusion can be drawn that the FDI methods’ perfor-
mance are varyingly sensitive to different pairs of actuators in accordance with the physical
construction of the specific aircraft, as well as the amount of actual process noise.
Actuator excitation is seen throughout the research to be the most important factor in
effective fault detection. Without sufficient actuator excitation, the residuals of both FDI
methods would be insufficiently dissimilar to produce meaningful FDI performance. In the
flight tests, however, natural excitation was shown to produce adequate FDI for the ailerons
and extra induced actuator excitation was shown to assist in detecting rudder faults.
The FDI methods developed in this research show that the design of the physical aircraft
influences the achievable FDI performance. It also illustrates that direct actuator sensor
costs can be reduced on the Meraka Modular UAV if the use of the chosen FDI be augmented
with an active actuator excitation supervisor and/or a process noise estimator. The research
topic is also rich in cross disciplinary subject matter that develops deep insight into the
workings of a typical aircraft system.
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Appendix A
Aircraft Parameters: The Meraka
Modular UAV
Parameter Value
Mass 26.0 kg
Wing Span 4.0 m
Mean Aerodynamic Chord 0.36 m
Wing Reference Area 1.44 m2
Wing Aspect Ratio 11.11
Wing Efficiency Factor 0.85
Table A.1: Meraka Modular UAV physical parameters.
The moment of inertia tensor was determined by weighing and measuring the separate air-
craft components and creating an accurate three-dimensional computer model. The moment
of inertia tensor was calculated with Autodesk Inventor® as
Ib =
12.18 0 00 5.86 0
0 0 17.29
 kg.m2 (A.0.1)
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Parameter Value
CD0 0.06
CL0 0.5
CLα 5.557928
CYβ -0.389444
CM0 -0.05
CMα -1.069455
Clβ -0.071508
Cnβ 0.102214
Table A.2: Meraka Modular UAV stability derivatives.
Each column in table A.3 represents the transpose of the control derivative row vectors
used in equations 2.6.11 to 2.6.16.
Actuator Clδ CYδ CLδ CMδ CNδ
Left Aileron -0.47515 -0.009786 -0.16364 0.062452 0.005796
Right Aileron 0.47515 -0.009786 -0.16364 -0.062452 0.005796
Left Flap 0.59232 -0.010199 0.11539 -0.065031 0.003495
Right Flap 0.59232 0.010199 -0.11539 -0.065031 -0.003495
Left Elevator 0.17624 -0.028361 0.0072193 -0.6157 0.0092819
Right Elevator 0.17624 0.028361 -0.0072193 -0.6157 -0.0092819
Left Rudder -0.3856 0.10766 0.0029221 0.13189 -0.035695
Right Rudder 0.3856 0.10766 0.0029221 -0.13189 -0.035695
Table A.3: Meraka Modular UAV control derivatives.
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Appendix B
Linearisation
B.1 State Matrices
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(B.1.1)
B.2 Partial Derivatives of the Elements in the State Matrices
This section is concerned with the linearisation process by determining the partial derivatives
contained in the state matrices of equation B.1.1 in section B.1. For the linearisation process
we note that the five states used in the FDI system are not dependent on the gravitational
or thrust forces and moments, but only on the aerodynamic forces and moments. The value
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of α is assumed small so that cosαT ≈ 1 and sinαT ≈ αT . The forward velocity U is
approximated by |V| as is done in equation B.2.55 and B.2.82.
Note that qwp is the dynamic pressure from equation 2.6.1 evaluated at the working point.
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The partial derivative terms relating the actuators to the states are very similar. For con-
venience the specific actuator subscript will be substituted by . The resulting partial
derivatives are
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Appendix C
Process and Measurement Covariance
Matrices
Uncertainty is found in all practical systems. The precise value of the states, measurements
and even the active fault scenario is uncertain and random. Fortunately these uncertainties
can be approximated closely with a compact parametric model. In the case of this research, a
normal (Gaussian) distribution was chosen as the parametric model, as discussed in chapter
3.
The state of the system is a multi-dimensional vector and normal distributions of vectors are
called multivariate. Multivariate normal distributions are characterised by density functions
of the following Gaussian form [41]:
p(x) = 1
(2pi)m2 |Σ|0.5 exp
(
−12(x− µ)
TΣ−1(x− µ)
)
(C.0.1)
where m is the vector dimension. The distribution is parameterised by the mean vector
and the covariance matrix, also called the moments parameterisation. The mean vector
describes the expected values of x
µ =

E[x1]
E[x2]
...
E[xm]
 (C.0.2)
where n is the dimension of x.
The covariance of two random variables is defined as
Cov(xi, xj) = E[(xi − E[xi])(xj − E[xj ])] (C.0.3)
where the covariance describes how these two random variables change together. The vari-
ance of a random variable is defined as
Var(xi) = E[(xi − E[xi])2] (C.0.4)
124
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which is an indication of the statistical spread of the variable.
The covariance matrix contains all the possible covariances of the elements in the correspon-
ding vector, including the elements’ variance, where the diagonal terms of the covariance
matrix are the variance of the elements. The covariance matrix is a positive semi-definite
and symmetrical matrix with the form
Σ = E[xxT ] (C.0.5)
=

Var(x1) Cov(x1, x2) . . . Cov(x1, xm)
Cov(x2, x1) Var(x2) . . . Cov(x2, xm)
...
... . . .
...
Cov(xn, x1) Cov(xn, x2) . . . Var(xm)
 (C.0.6)
For the linear and extended Kalman filter the initial state covariance matrix as well as the
process and measurement covariance matrices are required. Usually it can be assumed the
initial state, in which the state covariance matrix is assumed zero, is known exactly. The
remaining problem is to find the covariances for the process and measurement noise.
C.1 Process Noise
The process noise covariance matrix describes the covariances of wk in equation 3.2.4. Pro-
cess noise can be described in practical terms as the difference in dynamics between the
mathematical model and the real aircraft, as well as external disturbances such as wind
and structural phenomena. It is therefore not a straightforward process of determining the
covariances, since no information is available to determine this statistical difference precisely.
A wind model was used with the mathematical model of equation 3.2.4 to empirically de-
termine the process noise covariance. The process noise covariance matrix is very sensitive
to the amount of disturbance: where a higher amount of disturbance induces a larger valued
matrix.
Rw ≈ V2wind

69.5 −51.2 0 0 0
−51.2 76.5 0 0 0
0 0 94.75 −36.9 −67.1
0 0 −36.9 38.1 11.2
0 0 −67.1 11.2 85.2
× 10
−9 (C.1.1)
where V2wind represents the expected wind velocity. For the development of this research, a
value of 2 m/s was used, in accordance with previous flight test data.
The process noise covariance matrices for the fault scenarios are somewhat different from the
no-fault case in that the estimated actuator deflection also has an effect on the covariances
of the states. By using V2wind = 2 m/s, the noise covariance matrices for the fault scenarios
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were determined to be
(Rw)Ar =

0.29 −0.223 0 0.06 −0 −0.056
−0.223 0.523 0 0.194 −0 −0.18
0 0 0.392 −0.187 0.284 −0
0.060 0.194 −0.187 4.912 −0.0292 −4.319
0 −0.008 0.284 −0.292 0.0591 0.169
−0.056 −0.180 −0 −4.319 0.0169 4

× 10−6 (C.1.2)
(Rw)Al =

0.290 −0.223 0 −0.06 0 0.056
−0.223 0.523 0 −0.194 0 0.18
0 −0 0.392 −0.187 0.284 0
−0.06 −0.194 −0.187 4.912 −0.292 −4.319
0 0 0.284 −0.292 0.591 0.169
0.056 0.18 0 −4.319 0.169 4

× 10−6 (C.1.3)
(Rw)Er =

0.289 −0.217 0 0 0 −0.021
−0.217 1.3 0 0.084 0.122 −1.773
0 0 0.392 −0.189 0.284 0
0 0.084 −0.189 0.258 −0.096 −0.191
0 0.122 0.284 −0.096 0.603 −0.275
−0.021 −1.773 0 −0.191 −0.275 4

× 10−6 (C.1.4)
(Rw)El =

0.289 −0.217 0 0 0 −0.021
−0.217 1.301 0 −0.084 −0.122 −1.773
0 0 0.392 −0.189 0.284 0
0 −0.084 −0.189 0.258 −0.096 0.191
0 −0.122 0.284 −0.096 0.603 0.275
−0.021 −1.773 0 0.191 0.275 4

× 10−6 (C.1.5)
(Rw)Rr =

0.289 −0.226 0 0 0 0
−0.226 0.551 0 0 0.1 −0.380
0 0 0.392 −0.188 0.281 0.013
0 0 −0.188 0.250 −0.129 0.077
0 0.100 0.281 −0.129 0.863 −1.056
0 −0.380 0.013 0.077 −1.056 4

× 10−6 (C.1.6)
(Rw)Rl =

0.289 −0.226 0 0 0 0
−0.226 0.551 0 0 −0.100 0.380
0 0 0.392 −0.188 0.281 0.013
0 0 −0.188 0.250 −0.129 0.0077
0 −0.100 0.281 −0.129 0.863 −1.056
0 0.380 0.013 0.077 −1.056 4

× 10−6 (C.1.7)
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C.2 Measurement Noise
The measurement noise covariance matrix describes the covariances of vk in equation 3.2.5.
The measurement noise is determined by sensor data sheets. It is assumed that sensor rea-
dings are independent of one another and therefore the covariances between the measure-
ments will be zero. The resulting covariance matrix is a diagonal matrix with the variances
of the measurement noise as its elements.
The data sheets show that the angle of attack and angle of sideslip have a noise variance of
20×10−6 in radians squared. The angular rate sensors have a noise variance of 109.66×10−6
in radians squared, which results in a measurement noise covariance matrix of
Rv =

20 0 0 0 0
0 109.66 0 0 0
0 0 20 0 0
0 0 0 109.66 0
0 0 0 0 109.66
× 10
−6 (C.2.1)
The fault scenario Kalman filters use the same measurement noise covariance matrix, as
they use the same sensor data as the no-fault Kalman filter
(Rv)f = (Rv)nf (C.2.2)
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Appendix D
Healthy and Faulty Residuals
Covariance Matrices
D.1 Healthy Residuals Covariance Matrices
The healthy covariance matrix without passing through a low pass filter.
ΣH =

0.3516 −0.0082 0.6645 0.4644 0.1399 −0.0486
−0.0082 0.3516 −0.4644 −0.6645 −0.0486 0.1399
0.6645 −0.4644 1.9350 1.8184 0.3222 −0.2693
0.4644 −0.6645 1.8184 1.9350 0.2693 −0.3222
0.1399 −0.0486 0.3222 0.2693 3.2939 3.1951
−0.0486 0.1399 −0.2693 −0.3222 3.1951 3.2939

(D.1.1)
The healthy covariance matrix after passing through a low pass filter.
ΣH =

10.3249 −0.2626 6.8788 4.1782 1.2825 −1.4424
−0.2626 10.3249 −4.4623 −7.3864 −1.2227 1.7051
6.8788 −4.4623 25.6371 22.7840 2.6558 −3.2867
4.1782 −7.3864 22.7840 25.6371 2.6179 −3.4418
1.2825 −1.2227 2.6558 2.6179 102.6914 97.0422
−1.4424 1.7051 −3.2867 −3.4418 97.0422 102.6914

× 10−3 (D.1.2)
D.2 Faulty Residuals Covariance Matrices Without the Effect of
Disturbances
ΣF,Ar =

0.5000 0.4422 0.3280 −0.2153 0.1354 0.1058
0.4422 0.3922 0.2909 −0.1909 0.1200 0.0938
0.3280 0.2909 0.2158 −0.1416 0.0891 0.0696
−0.2153 −0.1909 −0.1416 0.0930 −0.0584 −0.0457
0.1354 0.1200 0.0891 −0.0584 0.0368 0.0288
0.1058 0.0938 0.0696 −0.0457 0.0288 0.0225

N(τ,n)=0
(D.2.1)
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ΣF,Al =

0.3922 0.4422 0.1909 −0.2909 0.0938 0.1200
0.4422 0.5000 0.2153 −0.3280 0.1058 0.1354
0.1909 0.2153 0.0930 −0.1416 0.0457 0.0584
−0.2909 −0.3280 −0.1416 0.2158 −0.0696 −0.0891
0.0938 0.1058 0.0457 −0.0696 0.0225 0.0288
0.1200 0.1354 0.0584 −0.0891 0.0288 0.0368

N(τ,n)=0
(D.2.2)
ΣF,Er =

0.1390 −0.1044 0.2635 0.2436 0.1339 0.0064
−0.1044 0.0784 −0.1980 −0.1830 −0.1006 −0.0048
0.2635 −0.1980 0.5000 0.4621 0.2539 0.0121
0.2436 −0.1830 0.4621 0.4271 0.2347 0.0112
0.1339 −0.1006 0.2539 0.2347 0.1290 0.0061
0.0064 −0.0048 0.0121 0.0112 0.0061 0.0003

N(τ,n)=0
(D.2.3)
ΣF,El =

0.0784 −0.1044 0.1830 0.1980 −0.0048 −0.1006
−0.1044 0.1390 −0.2436 −0.2635 0.0064 0.1339
0.1830 −0.2436 0.4271 0.4621 −0.0112 −0.2347
0.1980 −0.2635 0.4621 0.5000 −0.0121 −0.2539
−0.0048 0.0064 −0.0112 −0.0121 0.0003 0.0061
−0.1006 0.1339 −0.2347 −0.2539 0.0061 0.1290

N(τ,n)=0
(D.2.4)
ΣF,Rr =

0.0148 −0.0022 0.0213 0.0141 0.0860 0.0771
−0.0022 0.0003 −0.0032 −0.0021 −0.0130 −0.0116
0.0213 −0.0032 0.0308 0.0204 0.1242 0.1113
0.0141 −0.0021 0.0204 0.0134 0.0821 0.0736
0.0860 −0.0130 0.1242 0.0821 0.5000 0.4491
0.0771 −0.0116 0.1113 0.0736 0.4491 0.4026

N(τ,n)=0
(D.2.5)
ΣF,Rl =

0.0003 −0.0022 0.0021 0.0032 −0.0116 −0.0130
−0.0022 0.0148 −0.0141 −0.0213 0.0771 0.0860
0.0021 −0.0141 0.0134 0.0204 −0.0736 −0.0821
0.0032 −0.0213 0.0204 0.0308 −0.1113 −0.1242
−0.0116 0.0771 −0.0736 −0.1113 0.4026 0.4491
−0.0130 0.0860 −0.0821 −0.1242 0.4491 0.5000

N(τ,n)=0
(D.2.6)
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D.3 Final Faulty Residuals Covariance Matrices
ΣF,Ar =

0.5103 0.4419 0.3349 −0.2111 0.1367 0.1044
0.4419 0.4025 0.2864 −0.1983 0.1188 0.0955
0.3349 0.2864 0.2414 −0.1188 0.0917 0.0663
−0.2111 −0.1983 −0.1188 0.1186 −0.0558 −0.0491
0.1367 0.1188 0.0917 −0.0558 0.1395 0.1258
0.1044 0.0955 0.0663 −0.0491 0.1258 0.1252

(D.3.1)
ΣF,Al =

0.4025 0.4419 0.1978 −0.2867 0.0951 0.1186
0.4419 0.5103 0.2108 −0.3354 0.1046 0.1371
0.1978 0.2108 0.1186 −0.1188 0.0483 0.0551
−0.2867 −0.3354 −0.1188 0.2414 −0.0670 −0.0925
0.0951 0.1046 0.0483 −0.0670 0.1252 0.1258
0.1186 0.1371 0.0551 −0.0925 0.1258 0.1395

(D.3.2)
ΣF,Er =

0.1493 −0.1047 0.2704 0.2478 0.1352 0.0049
−0.1047 0.0888 −0.2025 −0.1904 −0.1018 −0.0031
0.2704 −0.2025 0.5255 0.4848 0.2566 0.0088
0.2478 −0.1904 0.4848 0.4527 0.2373 0.0077
0.1352 −0.1018 0.2566 0.2373 0.2317 0.1032
0.0049 −0.0031 0.0088 0.0077 0.1032 0.1030

(D.3.3)
ΣF,El =

0.0888 −0.1047 0.1899 0.2022 −0.0035 −0.1020
−0.1047 0.1493 −0.2480 −0.2709 0.0051 0.1356
0.1899 −0.2480 0.4527 0.4848 −0.0085 −0.2380
0.2022 −0.2709 0.4848 0.5255 −0.0095 −0.2574
−0.0035 0.0051 −0.0085 −0.0095 0.1030 0.1032
−0.1020 0.1356 −0.2380 −0.2574 0.1032 0.2317

(D.3.4)
ΣF,Rr =

0.0251 −0.0025 0.0282 0.0183 0.0873 0.0757
−0.0025 0.0107 −0.0077 −0.0095 −0.0142 −0.0099
0.0282 −0.0077 0.0564 0.0431 0.1269 0.1081
0.0183 −0.0095 0.0431 0.0391 0.0847 0.0701
0.0873 −0.0142 0.1269 0.0847 0.6037 0.5461
0.0757 −0.0099 0.1081 0.0701 0.5461 0.5053

(D.3.5)
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ΣF,Rl =

0.0107 −0.0025 0.0090 0.0074 −0.0104 −0.0144
−0.0025 0.0251 −0.0186 −0.0287 0.0759 0.0877
0.0090 −0.0186 0.0391 0.0431 −0.0709 −0.0853
0.0074 −0.0287 0.0431 0.0564 −0.1087 −0.1276
−0.0104 0.0759 −0.0709 −0.1087 0.5053 0.5461
−0.0144 0.0877 −0.0853 −0.1276 0.5461 0.6037

(D.3.6)
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Appendix E
Flight Test Plan
Name of test Meraka Modular UAV FDI flight test 1
Date of test 19 September 2012
Location of test Helderberg Radio Flyers Club
34◦ 02′ 47.69′′ S 18◦ 44′ 26.55′′ E
Table E.1: Flight test details.
Table E.2 is an example of the form that must be signed by all parties involved in the flight
test to state that they understand the proposed flight test as well as the safety procedures
of the Helderberg Radio Flyers Club.
Team Member Name Signature Date
Flight Test Coordinator Hendrik Odendaal
Flight Test Coordinator
Lionel Basson
Assistant
Safety Pilot Michael Basson
Safety Officer Japie Engelbrecht
Table E.2: Safety and execution sign-in from.
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E.1 Introduction
E.1.1 Background
This Meraka Modular UAV flight test will serve as an analysis of the performance of the
FDI processes that were developed in this research. The UAV was already tested on the
2nd August 2012, where it displayed its flight readiness for this test.
E.1.2 Test Objectives
• To fail the actuators one by one in a controlled manner, at 0◦ locked-in-place.
• To fail the actuators one by one in a controlled manner, at 2.5◦ locked-in-place.
• To evaluate the performance of the aircraft with an actuator fault.
• To gather flight data while the aircraft is flying with faults.
E.1.3 Description of the Test Item
The Meraka Modular UAV will be used as the test aircraft. More specific technical infor-
mation can be found in appendix A as well as in chapter 2. The aircraft is shown in figure
5.1.
E.1.4 Test Scope
Michael Basson will take off manually and fly the aircraft until the trim of the aircraft is set
and he is comfortable with the aircraft performance. Michael will control the aircraft via
radio controller throughout the flight test, even when a fault is active.
The fault sequence will be pre-programmed so that the type of fault can be chosen in-flight
at the ground station. When ready, Michael can activate and de-activate the faults on the
remote control. Each fault will be activated for at least 20 seconds before again de-activating
it, except in cases where the fault is causing uncontrollable behaviour. All six actuators of
interest will be tested. These actuators are:
• Right aileron
• Left aileron
• Right elevator
• Left elevator
• Right rudder
• Left rudder
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When the test is finished Michael will de-activate any active faults and land the aircraft.
The test will first be executed by inducing only 0◦ locked-in-place faults, as these faults
should cause no uncontrollable behaviour. This is done to first identify whether the aircraft
will be able to sustain flight after such faults.
If the controllability of the aircraft is acceptable in the presence of faults, the same test will
be conducted, except that 2.5◦ locked-in-place faults will then be activated.
E.2 Test Preparation
E.2.1 Project Team
The project team will be notified of their tasks and handed a copy of this flight test plan
before the test.
• Hendrik Odendaal
• Lionel Basson
• Michael Basson
• Japie Engelbrecht
E.2.2 Logistical Support
For the transportation of the aircraft a vehicle will be hired from the Stellenbosch University
vehicle pool. The reservation number was: 2048622.
E.2.3 Briefings and Debriefings
Flight briefing will be done before the flight test and briefing will be done after the flight
test, both taking place at the airfield.
E.2.4 Safety
• The relevant test hazard analysis will be conducted before flight.
• First aid kit must be available.
• Fire services (extinguishers) must be available.
• Participants will be briefed on general safety regarding the UAV on the flight day.
• Refer and adhere to the checklist.
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E.3 Details of the Test
E.3.1 Test Conditions
Weather conditions will be monitored and the tests will only take place if the weather falls
within the requirements for these tests: there should be no rain and the wind must be below
10 m/s.
E.3.2 Data Required
The states of the system, as well as the actuator commands, are essential data that must
be logged.
E.3.3 Data Analysis
The data will be used to determine the performance of the FDI systems developed in this
research.
E.3.4 Acceptance Criteria
• All actuators fail one by one at 0◦ locked-in-place without trouble.
• All actuators fail one by one at 2.5◦ locked-in-place without trouble.
• All required data is logged correctly.
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E.4 Test Schedule
Test description Expected duration
Trim and check aircraft performance 1 minute
Fail right aileron at 0◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail left aileron at 0◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail right elevator at 0◦ (from trim) locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail left elevator at 0◦ (from trim) locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail right rudder at 0◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail left rudder at 0◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail right aileron at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail left aileron at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail right elevator at positive 2.5◦ (from trim) locked-
in-place
20 seconds
Fail left elevator at positive 2.5◦ (from trim) locked-
in-place
20 seconds
Fail right rudder at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Fail left rudder at positive 2.5◦ locked-in-place 20 seconds
Note: The battery power will be monitored constantly. If the power becomes too
low the aircraft will be landed and the batteries will be replaced.
Table E.3: The test schedule.
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E.5 Equipment Checklist
Vehicle-related CHECK
Two sets of charged batteries
Two chargers and a power supply
SD Card for data logging
Ground station CHECK
Ground station laptop
External matte LCD display
Ground station RF module
Fold up table
AC extension lead (5m) + multi-plug
Radio controller CHECK
RC transmitter
Backup battery for RC transmitter
Flight log + Bind plug
Camera equipment CHECK
Off-board video camera
Tripod
Still camera
Miscellaneous CHECK
Flight toolbox
Fire extinguisher
First aid kit
Two-way radios
Notes
Table E.4: Equipment checklist.
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